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Abstract
The  1950s  and  1960s  were  a  tumultuous  period  for  Singapore.  The  society 
transitioned  from  being  a  British  colony  after  the  Japanese  Occupation  into  an 
independent state in 1965, after having undergone a traumatic separation from Malaysia. 
The rapid changes that Singapore underwent as a country mirrored the developments 
within its local Muslim community. A community that experienced high divorces rates, 
child marriages and little restrictions on polygamy in the 1950s had been by the 1960s, 
seen the collapse of these practices.
This thesis seeks to explain the ideological and intellectual shift in the attitudes 
within the Muslim community towards the family unit. It argues that the emergence of 
reform-oriented  Muslim movements  in  the  shape  of  Islamic  modernists  and  Muslim 
feminists  in  the  early  twentieth  century  played  a  decisive  role  in  challenging  the 
established norms in the community. Both groups attempted to impose their agenda in the 
community, utilising a variety of different methods to spread their ideas. This however, 
led to  a tussle  between both groups as  they vied for  control  over  the agenda of  the 
Muslim family. By studying the various developments during this period, the thesis will  
trace the struggle for control and its eventual outcome.
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Introduction
The Muslim family: Problems and solutions
“In no other place – not even in Hollywood – is the divorce rate so high as this.”1
In the 1950s, Shirin Fozdar was one of the most prominent feminist activists 
in  Singapore.  Her  comment  equating  Singapore's  Muslim  community  with 
Hollywood  reflected  her  impression  of  the  magnitude  of  the  social  and  familial 
disintegration  occurring  within  Singapore's  Muslim  community  in  the  1950s  and 
1960s.  To Fozdar,  scandals  occurred  all  too often  that  were  more appropriate  for 
Hollywood; a place which to many evoked notions of immorality and debauchery, not 
befitting  a  Muslim community.  Thirteen-year-old  child  prostitutes,  eloping  lovers 
chased down by their irate parents, and teenaged single mothers abandoned by their 
husbands;  these  and  similar  stories  often  made  the  pages  of  the  newspapers  and 
hinted at the social and moral decline that Fozdar saw as prevalent in the community. 
The similar life stories of three different women  –  Endon, Hamida and Rugayah  ‒ 
which were featured in the Straits Times in 1950, exemplified Shirin Fozdar's claims. 
All three were married off at the young age of thirteen or fourteen to men almost 
twice their age. Hamida's marriage did not even last a week, while Endon was the 
luckiest of the lot with her marriage lasting a year. Divorced at such a young age, all 
three subsequently entered into new marriages, which again ended in divorces. For all 
three, their marriages left them saddled with young children they had to raise without 
receiving any maintenance from their ex-husbands.2 
1 Shirin Fozdar, “Divorce rate here is higher than in Hollywood, says Mrs. Fozdar”, Straits Times 
(henceforth referred to as ST), 29 January, 1954, p. 1.
2 “Child brides tell tragic stories”, ST, 1 October, 1950, p. 5.
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Shirin Fozdar's remarks, while seemingly sensationalistic, had some basis in 
reality. Between 1947 and 1957 more than 50 per cent of Muslim marriages ended in 
divorce. In 1953, for instance, 2,445 marriages and 1,417 divorces were registered, a 
divorce rate of 59 per cent.3 Many of these divorcees would have had to endure a 
similar fate to the three women; left without any independent means of livelihood, 
forced to remarry and potentially suffering mistreatment again at the hands of their 
new husbands. 
By the late 1960s however, these practices had ceased to be pressing problems 
for the Muslim community. The divorce rate plummeted from 50 per cent in 1958 to 
36 per cent in 1959, and dropped further to 17.6 per cent in 1964.4 In this period, the 
marriage ages of Muslim women rose, with the median marriage age increasing from 
16.1  years in 1947 to 22 years by  1970.5 The age gap between husband and wife 
dropped from a mean age difference of 9.3 years to 4.3 years.6 These developments 
meant that women were less likely to marry in their early teens, while getting married 
to men who were closer in age. In the space of two decades, the Muslim community 
experienced immense social changes which had a great impact on the structure of the 
community and the family. The problems that Fozdar attacked in 1954 seemed to be 
less pressing issues by the end of the 1960s.
Given such a  remarkable development,  it  is  not  surprising that  the  factors 
responsible  for  these  changes  became  a  subject  of  discussion  and  analysis.  One 
important factor which shaped the evolution of the Muslim family unit in Singapore 
3 Judith Djamour, The Muslim matrimonial Court in Singapore (London: University of London, 
Athlone Press, 1966), p. 129.
4 “A drop in Muslim divorces”, ST, 19 July 1965, p. 4; “Haji Ahmad forecasts a fall in Muslim 
divorces”, ST, 22 March 1960, p. 5.  
5 Gavin Jones, Marriage and divorce in Islamic South-East Asia (Kuala Lumpur; New York: Oxford 
University Press,1994) p. 64.
6 Ibid., p. 104.
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stemmed  from  the  demands  of  a  modernising  economy.  Singapore's  experience 
mirrored other  industrialising countries whose societies had to change in  order to 
cope  with  the  greater  demand  for  labour  in  the  factories.  In  this  industrialising 
economy,  women  enjoyed  more  employment  opportunities,  giving  them  an 
opportunity to move beyond their previous roles in the household. This was reflected 
in the increase in the labour participation rate for females above the age of ten which 
more  than  doubled  from  6.3  per  cent  in  1957  to  14.3  per  cent  in  1970.7 The 
opportunity to work in factories meant that women enjoyed a degree of economic 
independence that had been previously unavailable. It also meant that there was less 
need for them to get married as they could support themselves adequately. Moreover, 
their contributions to the family’s financial well-being allowed them a greater leeway 
to voice their opinions in their personal life. Consequently, these developments served 
to delay women from marrying, since they were no longer dependent on others. 
Education,  while  critical  in  fuelling  the  drive  towards  a  more  modern 
economy, also helped to change an individual's mentality and mindset. In her study of 
Islamic societies, Elizabeth White argues that education helps to weaken the strength 
of traditional Islamic institutions and remove the traditional practices that constrain 
women  from  public  participation.8 White's  argument  can  be  applied  to  the 
Singaporean context,  as  education's  liberating  effect  took root  quickly among the 
newly educated women. This was clearly exhibited in a  Straits Times article on 19 
July 1959 featuring the first two Malay girls, Asiah bte. Abu Bakar and Azizah bte. 
Abbas, to read History in the University of Malaya in Singapore. Asiah called on 
7 Ibid., p. 35.
8  Elizabeth White, “Legal reform as an indicator of women’s status in Muslim nations”, in Women in 
the Muslim World, ed. Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1978), p. 65.
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Malay women to make further inroads into higher education and revealed her desire 
to see more “inspiring woman leaders” serve as exemplars to other women.9 
In this regard, Heather Strange's work shows the impact of education and how 
it  contributed  to  women's  empowerment  and  emancipation  within  a  Muslim 
community.  In  her  study of  a  Malay village  in  Trengganu,  Strange describes  the 
situation  of  two Malay-Muslim women,  Selmih  and Rohimah who studied  at  the 
University of Malaya and a Teacher's College respectively. Rather than acquiescing to 
the  arranged marriage  which  her  parents  had proposed,  Selmih  chose to  marry a 
different  man while  Rohimah's  choice  of  marriage  partner  was  made  at  her  own 
behest and without any interference from her parents.10 The above examples suggest 
that the benefits of education were twofold: by staying in school longer, it ensured 
that girls delayed their marriages while also equipping them with the necessary skills 
and knowledge to make their own informed decisions. These changes in the attitudes 
of  Malay  women  were  noticed  even  by  those  outside  the  community.  As  Mary 
Heathcott, a writer visiting Singapore in 1950 remarked, Malay women that used to 
be “flitting shadows” a decade previously were now being replaced by a generation of 
educated  women  “as  poised  as  modern  Indian  and  Chinese  girls”.11 Through 
education, women reduced their dependence on their husband and family for support, 
were  more  assertive  of  their  rights  and  subsequently  less  willing  to  endure 
mistreatment. With an increasingly educated community and greater exposure to the 
wider  world,  there  were  some  who  became  more  dissatisfied  with  the  existing 
conditions  in  the  community,  comparing  it  to  more  progressive  developments 
9 “They call for more inspiring woman leaders”, ST, 19 July 1959, p. 11.
10 Heather Strange “Continuity and change: Patterns of mate selection and marriage ritual”, Journal 
of Marriage and Family 38, 3 (Aug. 1976), p. 566.
11 Mary Heathcott, “Singapore revisited”, ST, 27 November 1950, p. 5.
4
elsewhere. It was from these educated classes that reformers emerged who were intent 
on  further  pushing  the  community  towards  a  reformation  of  its  perceived 
backwardness. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, it is possible to identify two major reformist groups 
‒ Islamic modernists  and Muslim feminists  ‒ who played a significant role. Both 
groups shared a similar aim in seeking to rid the community of the various problems 
which they deemed to be harmful. This period saw the emergence of Muslim activists 
and intellectuals such as Ahmad Ibrahim while Muslim bodies such as Jamiyah (All-
Malaya Muslim Missionary Society) and the Muslim Advisory Board (MAB) played 
instrumental roles in spearheading the drive for change in the community. It was in 
this period too that feminists began to play a more prominent role in the community. 
Che  Zahara,  Mrs  Siraj  and  Shirin  Fozdar  were  the  most  outspoken  advocates  of 
women's rights and pushed for reforms in the Islamic family laws in order to better  
protect women's welfare. 
Tham Seong Chee in contrast, has argued that change was initiated outside the 
community as the state's actions in legislating change “provided the  legal authority 
necessary  for  the  achievement  of  desirable  changes  in  the  Malay  family.”12 The 
utilisation of legislation to achieve social change in the Muslim community, as Tham 
claims, was evident from the 1950s. In that period, the colonial government began to 
adopt  a  more  active  approach  as  it  began  to  consider  possible  solutions  to  the 
problems affecting the community. One step towards the eradication of the problems 
came  with  the  passing  of  the  Muslim  Ordinance  in  1957.  It  legislated  for  the 
formation of a  Syariah Court  and the appointment  of a  President,  a  Chief  Kathi,  
12 Tham Seong Chee, “Social change and the Malay family”, in The Contemporary Family in  
Singapore: a structure and change, ed. Aline Wong and Eddie Kuo (Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 1979), p. 111.
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kathis and social workers to manage the cases brought to the Court's attention.13 With 
the  Court's  establishment,  registration  of  marriages  and  divorces  was  made 
compulsory.14 Moreover,  the  Ordinance  enabled  the  Court  to  appoint  hakam 
(arbitrators) to reconcile couples seeking divorce. Thus, through the promulgation of 
the  1957  Ordinance  and  the  Syariah  Court's  formation,  the  colonial  government 
demonstrated its determination to address what they considered to be the problems of 
the  Muslim  community  and  also  bring  these  previously  neglected  areas  under 
government control. 
The  expansion  of  government  control  into  the  regulation  of  Muslim laws 
culminated in the passing of the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) in 1966, 
this  time  under  the  auspices  of  the  independent  People's  Action  Party  (PAP) 
government.  It  allowed  for  the  formation  of  a  Majlis  Ugama  Islam  Singapura 
(MUIS/Islamic Religious Council of Singapore) tasked with advising the President of 
Singapore  in  Muslim  related  matters.15 Furthermore,  AMLA finally  introduced  a 
minimum age of  marriage  set  at  sixteen  years  old  for  both  males  and females.16 
Additionally,  the  state's  resources  could  be  channelled  to  the  Syariah  Court  and 
MUIS, thereby giving it a tool from which it could overcome the problems identified 
in the Muslim community. Thus, the state's proactive stance towards tackling these 
problems was critical in providing the political and legislative tools to bring change in 
the community. Through these measures, the state moulded the Muslim community's 
attitude and practices to fit in with the state's vision of social stability and progress. 
Thus, as seen above, the reasons for the decline of divorce and the changes in 
13 Ahmad Ibrahim, Development in the marriage laws in Singapore since 1959 (Singapore: Malayan 
Law Journal Pte. Ltd., 1979), p. 35.
14 Ibid., p. 37.
15 Ibid., p. 47.
16 Ibid., p. 52.
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the  marriage  patterns  in  Singapore's  Muslim  community  have  been  dealt  with 
extensively  by  scholars  and  provide  a  credible  explanation  for  the  changes 
experienced in the 1950s and 1960s. Changing social attitudes, greater educational 
and employment opportunities, the presence of Muslim reformers and  all played a 
part in solving the problem of divorce and influencing marriage patterns and practices 
in Singapore. 
Islam, Muslim, State
While these factors may have led to the changes in the Muslim community's 
views regarding the family unit,  the process was not an entirely smooth transition 
from one set of ideas to another. The process of change was a volatile one, and this 
thesis  seeks  to  uncover  the tensions  that  existed in  the community as  established 
practices  began  to  be  publicly  challenged.  By  focusing  on  the  ideological  and 
intellectual underpinnings which determined the evolution of the ideas and practices 
of “marriage” and “divorce” within the context of Singapore's Muslim community, 
this  thesis  will  demonstrate  the struggle  between different  contesting  ideas  in  the 
1950s and 1960s. 
This thesis focuses on the three agents who were significant players in this 
struggle for control – Islamic modernists, Muslim feminists, and the state. It seeks to 
firstly examine the reasons behind the emergence of these reformers and the state's 
expansion into the Muslim community's affairs. Armed with their visions of a proper 
Malay-Muslim family,  these  reformers  and the  state  subjected  the  status  quo and 
social practices that had long been tolerated and even accepted as the norm to intense 
criticisms and sought  to create  a  desire  for change amongst  their  contemporaries. 
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Islamic modernists and Muslim feminists both sought to reform the community and 
reinvigorate a family structure which they believed was crumbling under the impact 
of traditional customs and the abuse of the Islamic religion. Meanwhile, the PAP had 
its  own  agenda  that  necessitated  the  formulation  of  a  social  policy  that  would 
engender stability in a newly independent country. 
As  the  thesis  will  show,  the  competing  agendas  of  the  different  reformist 
groups  and  the  state  led  to  a  struggle  for  ideological  control  within  the  Muslim 
community. Moreover, this struggle for control occurred in the midst of a Muslim 
community, that while sharing the same religion, was ethnically diverse. Even though 
Malay-Muslims made up almost 80 per cent of the Muslim community, power was 
largely in the hands of the Arab and Indian Muslim minorities,17 adding a further layer 
of ethnic friction into an already problematic situation. By looking at the interaction 
between these three actors, it reveals the sites of contestations and the instances of 
cooperation and antagonisms between the various actors as they sought to impose 
their own vision and understanding of Islam and its laws on marriage and divorce on 
the  Muslim community.  By tracing  this  intellectual  evolution  within  the  Muslim 
community, it will identify the winners of this struggle for control and provide an 
explanation for the reasons behind their eventual success.
Defining Feminism and Modernism
Before  embarking  on  a  study of  the  activities  of  these  three  actors,  it  is 
important  to  distinguish  the  difference  between  the  two  reformist  groups  in  the 
Muslim community. Even as both groups attempted to reform the community's social 
17 James L. Peacock, Muslim Puritans: reformist psychology in Southeast Asian Islam (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978), p. 144.
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practices  concerning  marriage  and  divorce,  they  often  diverged  in  terms  of  their 
methods and the targets of their reformation efforts. Firstly, the thesis will clarify its 
usage of the term “Muslim feminists” in reference to the individuals who attempted to 
present  their  arguments  on  Islamic  scripture  that  supported  a  change  in  society's 
attitude towards women's rights and privileges. The use of the term “feminism” in a 
Muslim context present several difficulties, especially as the term is usually applied to 
the developments that occurred in Western societies. Additionally, the thesis' focus on 
Islamic modernists and Muslim feminists  as two distinct groups may imply a gender 
divide between these two groups, with women pushing for their own set of Islamic 
ideas against that of the male-dominated Islamic modernists. To avoid such polemics, 
this thesis will highlight the instances in which men and women crossed the gender 
divide, united by their shared ideas or opposition to other views rather than by gender. 
Male reformists were willing to introduce reforms that would benefit women, though 
as the thesis will show, modernists' willingness had its limits as they proved unwilling 
to  accede  to  some of  the changes  feminists  demanded.  Consequently,  in  order  to 
understand the  interaction  between these  two reformist  groups,  it  is  important  to 
appreciate  the origins of the two reform movements which would later have a great 
impact on the intellectual evolution of Singapore's Muslim community.
 Margot Badran attempts to carve a place for feminism in Islam by defining 
feminism as an “awareness of constraints placed upon women because of their gender 
and  attempts  to  remove  these  constraints  and  to  evolve  a  more  equitable  gender 
system  involving  new  roles  for  women  and  new  relations  between  men  and 
women”.18 Badran  argues  that  with  this  broad  definition,  it  allows  feminism  to 
18 Margot Badran, Feminists, Islam and Nation: Gender and the making of Modern Egypt (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 19-20.
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become “inclusive, rather than exclusive”, and that there are other forms of feminism 
beyond the model that developed in the West.19 By doing so, Badran argues that Islam 
is not inimical to feminism, and sees the possibility of a form of feminism appearing 
in  Muslim societies.  Under  such  situations,  Islam becomes  one  of  the  tools  that 
women use to raise their position in society. 
Additionally, Badran differentiates between two forms of feminism, Muslim 
secular feminism and Islamic feminism, that exist in Muslim societies, although she 
stresses  that  these two forms were not  mutually exclusive.20 For  instance,  Badran 
defines Islamic feminism as a “new discourse of interpretation of Islam and gender 
grounded in  ijtihad ...  paving the  way for  gender  liberation and social  change in 
particular  contexts”,21,  while  secular  feminism  contained  religious  and  nationalist 
elements and was “located within the context of a secular territorial nation-state”.22 In 
the context of this thesis, the term “feminists” will be used to refer to the women who 
used  the  “new  discourse  of  interpretation  of  Islam”  to  illustrate  how individuals 
challenged the gender inequality that they perceived to exist in their society's attitude 
towards Muslim marriage and divorce. 
Islamic modernism meanwhile refers to the cultural and religious response to 
the new challenges that Western imperialism brought into Muslim societies in the late 
nineteenth-century. The shock of  seeing  their  societies  subjugated by the colonial 
powers and the dramatic social changes that occurred jolted Muslims into a process of 
introspection. The failure to prevent the incursion of the non-Muslim colonial powers 
19 Ibid., p. 20.
20 Margot Badran, Feminism in Islam: secular and religious convergences (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009), 
p. 2.
21 Ibid., p. 3.
22 Ibid., p. 3.
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meant that Islam and its role in society came to be increasingly questioned.23 Ottoman 
Turkey  and  Egypt  became  the  centres  for  the  development  of  the  new  Islamic 
intellectual  thought,  as these two areas were among the most  exposed to Western 
influence. The Western challenge was not limited only to the political structure, for 
the  Western  incursion  also  brought  a  wave  of  Western  scholars  with  their  own 
intellectual and ideological ideas regarding Islam. It was under this onslaught of the 
Western intellectual confrontation that further stimulated the emergence of Islamic 
modernism as  a  response  to  these  attacks  on  Islam,  as  individuals  attempted  to 
incorporate these new ideas into the Islamic fold.24
Faced  with  this  impact  of  Westernisation  on  their  societies,  some Muslim 
scholars  began  to  question  the  role  that  Islam  played  in  the  stagnation  of  their 
societies. For them, it was necessary to bring forth a wave of religious reformation 
and change that  would enable  society to  cope with  the  new challenges  posed by 
Western  outsiders.  These  scholars  such  as  Jamal-al-Din  Al-Afghani,  Muhammad 
Abduh and Rashid Rida promoted the use of  ijtihad –  using one's own judgement 
based on the Quran and Sunnah as a response to changes in society – as a means of  
reviving  and  strengthening  the  religion  and  ensuring  the  religion's  continued 
progress.25 To this new wave of Islamic modernists, Muslims should not cling to the 
rulings of past authority, but instead come up with new interpretations as a means of 
coming to terms with the challenges posed by an evolving society.26 Imbued with this 
desire for change, modernists targeted conservative Muslim scholars whom they saw 
23 Ira M. Lapidus, “Islamic revival and modernity: the contemporary movements and the historical 
paradigms”, Journal of the Economic and Social history of the Orient 40,4 (1997), p. 450
24 Fazlur Rahman, Islam and modernity: Transformation of an intellectual tradition (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 46-47. 
25 John Esposito, Islam and politics (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1998), pp. 50, 
59.
26 Ibid., p. 59.
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as being resistant to change and failing to keep up with changes in the world.27 In this 
way, rather than bringing new laws or systems, Islamic modernism presented itself as 
a new mentality which sought to combine modernity and religion. As John Esposito 
argues, this mentality “fostered a transformation in the meaning of traditional beliefs 
and institutions to accommodate and legitimate modern political and social change.”28 
It  was  the  intellectual  flexibility  predicated  on  the  use  of  reason  which  defined 
Islamic modernism in its attempts to reform Islam.
It was partly from the modernist desire to re-evaluate and reinterpret Islam 
that  Muslim feminism later  emerged in Egypt  during the early twentieth  century. 
Qasim  Amin,  a  male  judge,  spearheaded  this  drive  towards  an  expansion  of  a 
woman's previously restricted role in society. With the publication of his book Tahrir  
al-Mar'ah (The Liberation of the Woman) in 1899, Amin utilised several modernist 
arguments such as the use of  ijtihad to justify the reformation of practices that had 
limited women to largely domestic roles.29 Amin's work set the foundation for later 
feminists who expanded on the ideas which he had introduced in his book. 
The impetus for these later feminists stemmed from their dissatisfaction with 
the lack of progress concerning women's rights despite the Islamic modernists' efforts. 
Women such as Huda Sha'arawi, the founder of the Egyptian Feminist Union in 1923, 
and Doria Shafik, the founder of the Daughters of the Nile in 1952, thus embarked on 
their own campaigns to expand women's place in society. Huda Sha'rawi in particular, 
created a stir with her dramatic decision to cast off her veil upon her return to her 
country as a symbolic protest against the restrictions placed on women in Egyptian 
27 Javaid Saeed, Islam and modernization: a comparative analysis of Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey 
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994), p. 128.
28 Ibid., p. 59.
29 Margot Badran, Feminists, Islam and  Nation: gender and the making of modern Egypt (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 19-20.
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society.30 In contrast with their modernist counterparts, feminists were more amenable 
to Western influence and saw the advances made by women in Western societies as an 
inspiration. It was perhaps no coincidence that Huda Sha'rawi's daring decision came 
upon her  return  from an international  feminist  meeting  in  Rome.  With  this  open 
challenge to established social norms, Huda Sha'rawi and  other feminists brought the 
fight for women's rights into the public sphere, and paved the way for women to play 
a greater public role in deciding their own fate in the future.
The emergence of these two reformist orientations in Egypt quickly filtered 
through to the rest of the Muslim world. The Malay Peninsula was also caught in this  
wave of new ideas, as individuals sought to apply this new mode of religious thought 
into the local Malay-Muslim community. Local modernists and feminists emerged, 
and strived to create a community that they believed would be closer to their vision of 
an ideal Muslim community. In order to create their ideal community, these reformers 
targeted several practices which they believed were inappropriate for a proper Muslim 
community.
 One  main factor seen as contributing to the breakdown of marriages in post-
war Singapore's Muslim community was a man's  right to  talaq (divorce) his wife 
without the need to give any prior reason. In a letter to the Straits Times in 1947, Che 
Zahara  brought  this  issue  to  the  public's  attention  when  she  argued  that  many 
husbands  exploited  their  right  to  divorce,  abandoning  their  wives  when  she  was 
unable  to  bear  them children.31 This  attitude,  according to  Che Zahara  and other 
critics of indiscriminate  talaq, meant  that  women constantly lived in  fear  as  they 
30 Denis J. Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, Islam in contemporary Egypt: Civil society vs the state 
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publications, 1999), p. 103.
31 “Malay women seek marital reforms”, ST, 12 October 1947, p. 5.
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could be easily discarded if their husbands fell out of love  with them.32 Kathis, the 
religious  officials  handling  marriage  and divorce  cases,  were  implicated  in  men's 
indiscriminate use of talaq. They were accused of allowing men to register a divorce 
easily, without checking on the men's circumstances and sometimes without the wife's 
knowledge.33 This abuse of the right to talaq and the kathi's laxness combined to give 
men an easy way out of a marriage. These critics also blamed men for their frivolous 
attitude towards the sacred vows of marriage; divorcing and abandoning their  ex-
wives with the kathi's complicity without a second thought. To the reformers, it was 
apparent that men had been abusing the privileges which the religion had given to 
them.
A high divorce rate was not the only problem seen as having a detrimental 
effect on the Muslim community. Early marriages, in which some girls barely out of 
puberty  were  married  off  to  older  men,  also  came  under  heavy  criticism for  its 
perceived exploitation of women. One infamous case was the Nadrah/Maria Hertogh 
incident  in  1950,  in  which  fourteen-year-old  Nadrah  was  married  of  to  Mansoor 
Adabi,  a  twenty-two year-old  teacher.  The  validity  of  the  marriage  was  a  highly 
contentious issue, for it depended on whether Dutch, English or Muslim  Law was 
applied,  and  it  was  even  brought  forward  to  the  Singapore  Law  Courts.34 This 
infamous case was not an entirely rare occurrence, as seen from the criticisms that the 
writer  Syed  Abdullah  Al-Edros  levelled  on  the  practice  of  child  marriages  in  his 
magazine Qalam and in his novels. In one such critique, he condemned parents who 
were eager to marry their daughters off to aged religious teachers, in the belief that by 
32 S.B.S, “My husband went without a word”, ST, 22 November 1947, p. 9.
33 M. Ibrahim, “The anger of a happy husband”, ST, 23 April 1955, p.12.
34 “Maria's marriage sets a problem”, ST, 4 August 1950, p. 1.
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doing so, they were committing a virtuous act.35 Forced marriages also came under 
attack, especially the marriage of virgin girls, for it was seen as depriving the woman 
of  her  right  to  accept  or  reject  her  prospective  husband.36 By being  forced  into 
marriages at very young age, critics argued that these girls found themselves at the 
mercy of their  husbands and were often ill-equipped to deal with the demands of 
sustaining a stable marriage.
Lastly, the practice of polygamy, which according to Islamic law, allowed men 
to have up to four wives, was seen as contributing to the family unit's instability. 
Though  seen  by  some  as  a  “lesser  evil”  compared  to  easy  divorce,37 it  was 
nevertheless criticized as something easily abused by men and one which endangered 
the wife's place in the household. Without any wrongdoing on her part, her position in 
the household could be displaced by the newer and younger  junior wife.  In most 
cases,  the  news  would  come as  a  shock to  the  wife,  as  she  found  herself  being 
presented  with  a  fait  accompli when  the  husband  contracted  a  second  marriage 
without  informing his  first  wife  beforehand.  In a  far  worse scenario,  without  her 
knowledge, a woman could be in a polygamous marriage, for her husband could be 
having another wife either in another part of Singapore or in the Malay Peninsula. 
Having  set  their  sights  on  these  key  issues,  reformers  pledged  to  either 
eradicate these practices or restore the original intent behind the practices which they 
believed had been lost through a shallow understanding of Islam. The solutions that 
the reformers offered will be further explored in the following chapters, illustrating 
vigorous debates that occurred between the various groups on Islamic matters and the 
35 Khadijah Adibah, “Ahmad Lutfi on the education and freedom of women: a critical examination of 
his views on the education and freedom of Muslim women in Malaya as stated and implied in his 
novels” (Academic Exercise- Dept of Malay studies, University of Malaya: 1957), p. 17.
36 Umm Muhsin, “Hak dan kebebasan perempuan”, Qalam, vol. 19,  February, 1952, p. 33.




By analysing the roles played by the various Muslim reformers,  the thesis 
hopes to contribute towards a greater awareness of Singapore's Muslim community 
place  in  the  Muslim  World.  It  serves  firstly  to  situate  Singapore  in  the  Islamic 
reformation and modernisation sweeping through the Muslim world in the twentieth 
century.  Many  scholars  have  already  illustrated  Singapore's  central  role  in  the 
dissemination  of  ideas  emanating  from the  Middle  East  to  the  rest  of  the  Malay 
Peninsula, and also the extent of the impact of these ideas on Singapore. William Roff 
for  instance,  describes  Singapore  as  the  “literary  and  publication  centre  for  the 
Malayo-Muslim world”,38 in  recognition of the key role  played by the city in the 
nineteenth  century,  which  persisted  into  the  middle  of  the  twentieth  century.  The 
founding of the influential literary movement ASAS-50, a politically inclined writer's 
movement that pushed for social change through their works, as seen in their slogan 
'Art for Society'  illustrates Singapore's  continued importance as a literary centre.39 
Singapore also continued to attract prominent Muslim figures such as Syed Syeikh 
Al-Hadi,  Zainal  Abidin  (Za'ba)  and  Abdul  Rahim  Kajai,  who  were  all  based  in 
Singapore  for  a  significant  part  of  their  lives.40 Through  the  works  of  these 
intellectuals, Singapore was kept abreast  of the latest developments in the Middle 
East.
38 William Roff, “The Malayo-Muslim world of Singapore at the close of the nineteenth century”, in 
Studies on Islam and society in Southeast Asia, ed. William Roff (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), p. 
83.
39 Joel S. Kahn, Other Malays: nationalism and cosmopolitanism in the modern Malay world 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006), p. 115.
40 Aktivis Melayu/Islam di Singapura, ed. Sulaiman Jeem & Abdul Ghani Hamid (Singapore: 
Persatuan Wartawan Melayu Singapura, 1997), pp. 5, 222-223, 390. 
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Studying  Islamic  marriage  and  divorce  reforms  further  expands  our 
understanding of the ways in which ideas from the Middle East affected intellectual 
and religious developments in Singapore. Marriage reforms and related debates were 
just as heatedly discussed in the Middle East as they were in Singapore. This was 
because the experiences of Singapore's Muslim society were not unique, for it was 
replicated  in  other  Muslim  communities.  High  divorce  rates,  criticisms  of  early 
marriages and polygamy, and changes made in favour of greater protection of women 
were also apparent in the Middle Eastern countries. For instance Republican Turkey 
passed the Family Law in 1926 and established a legal marriage age of eighteen for 
men and 17 for women.41 Meanwhile in 1920 and 1929, Egypt enacted laws making it 
compulsory for all marriage contracts and divorces to be registered, and  required that 
the wife be informed of any divorce procedures initiated by the husband.42 Eventually, 
the reforms carried out in the Middle East were later replicated in Singapore's Muslim 
community.  The  reasons  why  these  changes  came  decades  after  they  were 
implemented in the Middle East will be an issue that will be answered by this thesis.
Furthermore, this approach provides another facet in assessing the nature of 
Islamic reformism in the Malay Peninsula. Most scholars who have dealt with this 
issue have tended to focus on the  Kaum Tua/Kaum Tua dichotomy and the reasons 
behind  Islamic  modernists'  failure  to  effect  substantial  change  in  the  Muslim 
community. It pits the struggle between conservative religious scholars in the Kaum 
Tua faction against the new generation of Kaum Muda Muslim scholars influenced by 
Islamic modernism as the driving force between modernising efforts in the Malay 
Peninsula. Most works have focused on the reasons behind the Kaum Muda's failure 
41 White, “Legal reform as an indicator of women's status in muslim nations”, p. 55.
42 Sami Zubaida, Law and power in the Islamic world (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), p. 151.
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to seize control of the intellectual discourse, with scholars such as Ahmad Hussein 
attributing  the  reformists'  failure  to  their  poor  organizational  structure  and  the 
utopianism evident  in  their  “glorification  of  the  past  'golden  age'  that  seemed  to 
function as  a psychological  escape from current  inadequacies.”43 There have been 
attempts however, to re-evaluate the  Kaum Tua's impact on the Islamic intellectual 
development in the region. Hafiz Zakariya, for instance, has pointed out that despite 
Malay sultans' and British colonialists' support for Kaum Tua scholars and the latter's 
control of the religious establishments which impeded the reformist challenge to the 
status quo, much of the modernist ideas would later find themselves being adopted.44 
Building upon this re-evaluation of the Kaum Tua/Kaum Muda dichotomy, the thesis 
hopes to further highlight the role played by modernists in the Muslim community's 
intellectual evolution. 
Lastly,  Muslim  women's  contribution  to  the  social  developments  in  the 
community became apparent by looking at their actions in the marriage and divorce 
reforms.  Women were  active  participants  in  discussions  about  the  future  of  their 
community, and were not afraid to challenge men in the public sphere. The thesis will 
show that the 1950s and 1960s marked a period in time when women were acquiring 
the  confidence  to  speak  for  themselves  and  challenge  the  established  patriarchal 
system.  Using  Margot  Badran's  definition  of  feminism,  these  women  can  be 
considered  as  Muslim  feminists,  though  most  of  these  women  never  referred  to 
themselves as such. Even so, it is important to assess the extent by which the works of 
these feminists resonated within the Muslim community. It should not be assumed 
43 S. Ahmad Hussein, Muslim Politics in Malaysia: origins and evolution of competing traditions in  
Malay Islam (Braamfontein, South Africa: Foundation for Global Dialogue, 1998), p. 14.
44 Hafiz Zakariya, “Islamic reform in colonial Malaya: Shaykh Tahir Jalaluddin and and Sayyid 
Shaykh al-Hadi” (Phd. Dissertation- Department of History, University of California, Santa 
Barbara, 2006), p. 75.
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that such sentiments were widespread. As Haideh Moghissi cautions, “in the name of 
validating  women's  'self-perceptions'  and  'hearing  women's  own voices',  only  the 
voice of particular women are heard and ... broadcast as the unanimous expression of 
'women in Islamic societies'.”45 It  must  be stressed that  these women were still  a 
minority,  though  they  managed  to  acquire  a  public  presence  and  impact  which 
outstripped their actual numbers. 
The thesis utilises newspapers and magazines as the main historical sources 
for analysing the discourse around marriage and divorce. As Benedict Anderson has 
pointed out, print capitalism played a crucial role in forming “imagined communities” 
for  it  “created  unified  fields  of  exchange  and  communication”  thereby  allowing 
people to  connect  with one another  through a common medium.46 An analysis  of 
newspapers and magazines serves to not only identify the ways in which the different 
agents disseminated their agendas but also the way in which print culture helped the 
groups  to  further  solidify  their  identity  and  attracted  people  to  their  ideas.  Both 
English and Malay language print material will be used, for the different educational 
backgrounds of  both  the  newspaper  writers  and the  readership  impinged on their 
understanding of the issues at hand. Mainly, the thesis relies on the English language 
Straits  Times, the  Malay  language  Berita  Harian/Berita  Minggu,  and  the  Malay 
language  magazine  Qalam for  insight  into  topics  that  gathered  great  public 
discussion. These three sources have been selected because they provide an outlet to 
view the opinions that were expressed by the different individuals that were involved 
in this ideological discourse. The Straits Times and Berita Harian in particular, were 
accessible not only to Malay-Muslims but also to those outside the community such 
45 Haideh Moghissi, Feminism and Islamic fundamentalism (New York: Zed Books, 1999), p. 42.
46 Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism 
(London; New York: Verso, 2006), p. 44.
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as Fozdar and the PAP who had a stake in the proceedings. 
These sources are invaluable because they illustrate the ebb and flow of the 
discourse,  and also  highlight  the  major  issues  that  stirred  the  community.  In  this 
respect,  forum  columns  are  of  particular  importance.  As  Roff  points  out,  these 
columns presented an outlet for the public to share their thoughts with others, in a 
way which had not been possible previously,  allowing people to engage in debates 
concerning events which stirred their interests.47 Roff's analysis certainly rings true, 
for  the  continuation  of  the  debate  around  various  marriage  and  divorce  issues 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s highlights these topics' importance to the Muslim 
community and points towards the need to analyse and understand the evolution of 
this discourse.  
Having illustrated the need to understand the interaction and ideas that were 
forwarded  by  the  state  and  reformers,  Chapter  One  will  first  contextualise  the 
community's  preoccupation  with  the  family  and  its  problems.  From  there,  the 
following chapters  will  illustrate  the  ideological  underpinnings  of  the  modernists, 
feminists and the state as they attempted to push for further social reforms and the 
restoration of what they conceived  as the ideal Muslim family.
47 Roff, “The Malayo-Muslim world of Singapore at the close of the nineteenth century”, p.88-89.
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Chapter One
Islamic Modernist and Muslim Feminist calls for reform 
Two  groups  – Islamic  modernists  and  feminists  – were  among  the  most 
vociferous  in  their  condemnation  of  the  Muslim  community  and  its  customs  in 
Singapore and Malaya. This chapter will provide a brief history of the emergence of 
these two movements in the Malay Peninsula and their positions on the marriage and 
divorce practices prevalent in the Muslim community. Drawing upon these two sets 
of ideas, modernists and feminists took a closer look at their Muslim community and 
took  issue  with  practices  which  they  deemed  to  be  against  the  spirit  of  Islam, 
perceiving them as having destabilising effects on the community and the family unit. 
In their own way, modernists and feminists attacked the status quo in the community, 
and argued for a complete overhaul of  prevailing attitudes.
Islamic modernism and the family
The  family  unit  came  under  the  modernists'  gaze  due  to  the  family's 
importance in Islam. As Khurshid Ahmad notes, verses concerning the family and the 
explication of the rules that regulate it occupy a third of the Quran, emphasizing the 
extent  to  which  the  religion  sought  to  define  and  regulate  the  family  structure.1 
Khurshid's characterization of the family as a “society in miniature” is therefore an 
apt  one,  for  it  illustrates  clearly how the  health  of  the  family unit  reflected  and 
influenced the nature of the society itself. With the family as the cornerstone of an 
Islamic society, modernist attempts to reform society would thus involve intervening 
1 Khurshid Ahmad, Family life in Islam (Leicester, United Kingdom: Islamic Foundation, 1974), p. 
16.
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in the family structure.  
Attempts to reform the family, and by extension society, were evident from the 
beginnings of Islamic modernism in the late nineteenth century. Given women's major 
position in society as the administrators of the domestic household, their contribution 
in  the existing  state  of  affairs  and their  potential  role  in  the  family's  reformation 
quickly came under the modernists' scrutiny. Infused with a willingness to question 
existing  interpretations  and  emphasizing  the  primacy  of  Islamic  principles  over 
scriptural literalism, modernists identified several problems within the family which 
they  perceived  as  casting  a  detrimental  effect  on  the  family  and  society.  Some 
modernists  decried  society's  treatment  of  women,  highlighting  the  ways  in  which 
women were oppressed, and blamed men for the sad state of affairs. Polygamy and 
easy divorce in particular, were identified as among the major causes for the family's 
breakdown. The modernist Egyptian Mufti Muhammad Abduh delivered one of the 
most stinging critiques of polygamy and its abuse in society. Utilising ijtihad to argue 
that polygamy was previously allowed in the Prophet's time because of extenuating 
social  circumstances rather than a man's  divine-given right,  Abduh interpreted the 
Quranic verses dealing with polygamy as discouraging rather than encouraging it:
The Muhammadan law allows man to take up to four wives at a time 
if he thinks he is capable of treating them justly. But if he feels he is 
unable to fulfil this condition then he is forbidden to have more than 
one wife.2
Abduh's  fellow  Egyptian,  the  judge  Qasim Amin,  echoed  this  attack  on  Muslim 
society. In his book The Liberation of Women, Amin called for the restoration of the 
rights which Islam had given to women. He condemned men's unchallenged power to 
2 Muhammad Abduh, Al-Mar'a Fi al-Islam, p. 33, cited in Haifaa A. Jawad, The rights of Muslim 
women in Islam: an authentic approach (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire : Palgrave 
Macmillan Press , 1998), p. 45.
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initiate divorces and women's powerlessness in these matters. In order to correct this 
problem,  Amin suggested  that  both men and women be given the same rights  in 
divorce.3 By returning to what they perceived to be the true meaning of the Quran and 
Islam, nineteenth-century Islamic modernists such as Abduh and Amin attempted to 
cure the family unit of its perceived problems. 
In  their  criticisms  of  the  status  quo,  it  was  already possible  to  detect  the 
modernists' appeal to morality, and their desire to re-establish Islamic moral values in 
a society which had gone astray. Amin couched his criticisms of the status quo in a 
moralistic  manner,  calling  polygamy “nothing  short  of  a  legal  trick  to  satisfy an 
animal like desire. It symbolizes corrupt morals, insensitivity, and a gluttonous search 
for pleasure.”4 In another instance, he condemned men as the ones responsible for the 
victimization of women, because “man has stripped woman of her human attributes 
and has confined her to one office only, which is that he should enjoy her body.”5 
Muhammad Abduh expressed similar sentiments in his condemnation of the Muslim 
society, arguing that society had “erred in the education and training of women, and 
in not teaching them about their rights; and we have failed to follow the guidance of 
our  religion.”6 In their  indictment  of  men's  attitude towards  women,  the common 
theme was men's failure to live up to the demands that Islam had placed on men and 
their abuse of the religious precepts. 
The  modernists'  condemnation  of  men's  behaviour  was  accompanied  with 
3 Qasim Amin, Tahrir al-Mar'ah (Cairo, 1899), pp. 165, 184, cited in John Esposito, Women in 
Muslim family law (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982), p. 51. 
4 Qasim Amin, The liberation of women and The new woman: Two documents in the history of  
Egyptian feminism, translated by Samiha Sidhom Peterson (Cairo, American University in Cairo 
Press, 2001), p. 85.
5 Amin, Tahrir Al-mar'ah, p. 47, cited in Albert Hourani, Arabic thought in the Liberal Age, 1789-
1939 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 166.
6 Muhammad Abduh, Al Manar (Cairo: Al-Manar Press, 1912), 12:331, cited in John Esposito, 
Women in Muslim family law (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982), p. 50.
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calls for the restoration of women's rights, with women viewed as the key towards 
creating a stable Muslim family. They were, as Amin described, “the yardstick of the 
family. If she is vulgar, she will be despised by her husband, her relatives, and her 
children … their habits and morals will be corrupt”,7 and to reform the family would 
be to reform the woman. The salvation of society and family was therefore possible 
only through the restoration of women to their rightful place. For Islamic modernists, 
social reformation would begin with the woman's body.
Islamic modernism in the Malay Peninsula
Based on the arguments that the nascent Islamic modernism directed towards 
the family, modernists in the Malay Peninsula directed their attention towards their 
own society. This small group of educated elites used print as a medium to educate 
and reach out to a society that they perceived as backward and lacking in proper 
Islamic ethics. By the mid-twentieth century, the emergence of a more educated and 
literate community allowed modernists to expand their reach further. Moreover, more 
people were now allowed to contribute their ideas to be read and critiqued by others.
          The print medium was an important mode of discourse for modernists because 
of its ability to reach out to a larger audience. The role of print as a tool of social  
discourse began to increase especially after the 1930s, with the rapid expansion in the 
numbers of published newspapers.  One key feature of the newspapers in this  era, 
were their  roles  not  merely as  providers  of  information,  but  as  a  platform where 
opinions and views were aired and openly discussed.8  By allowing readers to provide 
their  input  on  matters  of  common  interest,  and  the  publication  of  regular 
7 Qasim Amin, The liberation of women and The new woman, p. 72.
8 Mark Emmanuel, “Viewspapers: The Malay Press of the 1930s”, Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 41,1 (February 2010), p. 10.
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commentaries,  newspapers  offered  their  readers  the  opportunity  to  voice  their 
concerns on matters that seemed to be affecting the community.9 
The  changing  nature  of  newspapers  gave  Islamic  modernists  an  outlet  to 
propagate and amplify their ideas to the masses, helping them to overcome their small 
numbers and peripheral position in the political and social institutions in the Muslim 
community.  Furthermore,  as  William  Roff  points  out,  though  these  journals  had 
limited  readership  numbers,  most  came  from  the  more  educated,  urban-based 
segments of the society,10  meaning that  its readers more often than not, came from 
the  more  influential  segments  of  society. The  emergence  of  newspapers  gave 
modernists  a  platform for  discussion  and debate,  and their  focus  on social  issues 
relevant to the Muslim community allowed them to engage others and to spread their 
reformist agenda on a larger scale.  
Some modernists  took the initiative  of  establishing  their  own journals  and 
magazines  to  advance  their  own  agenda.  The  formation  of  modernist-oriented 
journals such as Syed Sheikh Al-Hadi's Al-Imam in 1906 and Haji Abdullah Ahmad's 
Al-Munir  in  1911  served  as  the  flag-bearers  for  the  Kaum  Muda in  the  early 
twentieth-century,  and paved the way for future modernist journals. Both journals, 
according  to  Azyumardi  Azra,  were  heavily  influenced  by the  Islamic  modernist 
Rashid Rida's magazine,  Al-Manar.11 Moreover, he considers both journals as being 
“radical in its religious orientation” because they touched on topics, such as the use of 
Western clothing which were anathema to the Kaum Tua.12 Jan van der Putten's study 
9 Ibid., p. 20.
10 William Roff, Origins of Malay nationalism,  pp. 64, 66.
11 Azyumardi Azra, “The transmission of Al-Manar's reformism to the Malay-Indonesian world”, in 
Intellectuals in the modern Islamic world: transmission, transformation, communication, ed. 
Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Hisao Komatsu and Yasushi Kosugi, (London; New York: Routledge, 
2006), p. 143.
12 Ibid., p. 155.
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of  popular  culture  in  the  1930s  also  points  to  the  prominence  of  the  modernist 
discourse in the public sphere, with the widespread dissemination of Abdul Rahim 
Kajai's magazine Majlis that contained many articles revolving around the depiction 
of  a  problem-laden  Malay-Muslim society.13 As  a  result  of  the  increase  in  these 
reformist-oriented  publications,  the  modernist  message  of  social  and  religious 
reformation began to take root in the Muslim society, provoking discussion and even 
friction  amongst  the  community's  more  conservative  sections.  These  modernist 
portrayals of a problematic Muslim society thus served a two-fold purpose, it not only 
brought these matters to the public attention, but also functioned as an indictment of 
the Kaum Tua's failures as the community's religious leaders. 
One key modernist  journal that played a significant role in the discussions 
surrounding marriage and divorces in the 1950s and 1960s was Syed Abdullah bin 
Abdul  Hamid  Al-Edros'  Qalam.  Before  starting  Qalam,  Al-Edros  had  acquired  a 
degree of notoriety within the community after the publication of his  lurid books 
Pelayan (Waitress) and Terkorban di-bilik 69 (Sacrificed in room 69) in 1949, under 
the pen-name Ahmad Lutfi.14 Containing portrayals of sexual acts and wantonness, 
these books were designed to reveal the moral degradation which society seemed to 
be facing, and attempted to provide the solutions for these problems.15 As Taib Osman 
notes, Al-Edros' books were not literary masterpieces. Rather, they were “device(s) to 
present criticisms and ideas ... to influence the readers as to what were morally good 
13 Jan van der Putten, “Negotiating the Great Depression: The rise of popular culture and 
consumerism in early-1930s Malaya”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 41,1 (February 2010), 
pp. 28-29. 
14 Timothy P. Barnard and Jan van der Putten, “Malay cosmopolitan activism in Post-War Singapore” 
in Paths not taken: political pluralism in post-war Singapore, ed. Micheal Barr and Carl Trocki 
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), p. 138.
15 Mohd Taib Osman, “Classical and modern Malay literature”, in Handbuch der Orientalistik, 
Abshcn. 1, ed. L.F. Brakel (Leiden; Koln: E.J. Brill, 1976), p. 156.
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and what was otherwise.”16  The inspiration for Al-Edros' books came from society 
itself.  Adept  at  capitalizing  on controversies  brewing in the  community,  Al-Edros 
used these emotionally stirring issues as fodder for his books. He was unapologetic 
about  his  writing formula,  arguing that  success  came from satisfying the people's 
reading desires,  and also by taking advantage  of  current  events.17 After  acquiring 
literary and financial success through his books, Al-Edros turned away from writing 
novels and moved towards more non-fictional endeavours. Shedding the pen-name, 
Al-Edros used the same template for Qalam, albeit without the luridness.
Al-Edros founded Qalam in 1950 with the hope that it could become “another 
wheel  for  progress  in  Malay  literature”,  envisioning it  as  an outlet  for  writers  to 
express themselves,  as part  of efforts  to  impart  knowledge to the community.18 It 
featured both religious and secular articles, seeking to illuminate its readers on the 
latest developments inside and outside of the community. As a result, Qalam featured 
an eclectic mix of articles that were sometimes unconnected with one another. It was 
common  to  find  articles  on  topics  as  diverse  as  Malayan  politics,  Islamic 
jurisprudence and foreign affairs within the same issue. Meanwhile, sections such as 
Dari  Sebulan ke  Sebulan (From month  to  month)  and  Kopi  Pahit (Bitter  coffee) 
functioned as commentaries on events that had occurred over the past month. Readers 
were also given the opportunity to submit questions to the periodical, which were 
published  and  answered  through  the  column  1001  Masalah (1001  problems) 
administered by Abul Akhtar. 
Qalam's socio-moral agenda and Al-Edros' keen eye for controversy allowed 
16 Ibid., p. 157. 
17 Ahmad Lutfi “Persuratan Melayu III” (Singapore: Qalam, 1962), p. 111, cited in Li Chuan Siu, The 
modern Malay literature (Yogyakarta: Penerbitan Yayasan Kanisius Yogyakarta, 1975), p. 111.
18 “Selamat berhari raya Aidilfitri”, Qalam, vol. 1. July-August 1950, p. 3.
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Qalam to  keep  its  pulse  on  the  ebb  and  flow  of  society.  It  responded  to  the 
disturbances  in  the  Muslim  community,  while  also  attempting  to  direct  the 
community's attention to Qalam's desired target. Qalam's tactics seemed to pay off, as 
it  waded into  several  public  spats  with  the  United  Malays  National  Organisation 
(UMNO) and the  Mufti  of  Johor  in  the  1950s over  the  magazine's  inflammatory 
contents.19 Despite  being largely a  one-man operation,  it  nevertheless  managed to 
impress itself onto the public consciousness.
Al-Edros and Qalam were not the only modernists voices that existed in the 
1950s.  There  were other  competing modernist  voices  possessing  their  own set  of 
ideas and beliefs derived from Islamic modernism. Ahmad Ibrahim, for instance, had 
by 1950 already acquired a prominent role in the community through his extensive 
legal  career  and  position  in  several  Muslim  organisations,  such  as  his  stint  as 
President  of  the  Young  Muslim  Men's  Association.20 Ahmad  Ibrahim's  extensive 
knowledge of both the secular legal traditions and Islamic  Syariah made him well-
placed  to  comment  on  any  reforms  that  could  conceivably  occur  in  the  Malay 
Peninsula's political and legal system.21 \His unique position straddling the religious 
and  secular  arena  was  demonstrated  in  his  attempts  to  place  Muslim  madrasahs 
(religious schools) on a level playing field with secular schools. Using his position as 
a Legislative Councillor, Ahmad Ibrahim attempted to push for greater government 
support for madrasahs in order to enhance the madrasah's quality of education.22
19 Jan van der Putten, “Some preliminary observations about popular Malay writings of the 1950s”, in 
Malay literature from traditional to contemporary, ed. Abdul Rahman Yusof, Zaiton Ajamain and 
Norazian Ahmad (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 2007), p. 73.
20 Abdul Aziz Bari, “Ahmad Ibrahim and the Islamisation of law in Malaysia”, in Monograph on 
selected Malay intellectuals, ed. Md. Som Sujimon (Kuala Lumpur: Research Centre, International 
Islamic University Malaysia, 2003), p. 232. 
21 Kikue Hamayotsu, “Politics of Syariah reform”, in Malaysia: Islam, society and politics, ed. 
Virginia Hooker and Noraini Othman (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), p. 62.
22 Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied, Colonialism, violence and Muslims in Southeast Asia: The Maria  
Hertogh Controversy and its aftermath (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 116, 118.
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In  addition,  Muslim  modernist  organisations  such  as  Muhammadiyah  and 
Jamiyah were also highly active in their efforts to educate and reform a community 
which had, in their  opinion, sunk into disarray.  The former,  though only formally 
created in 1958, first reached Singapore in the post World War Two period with the 
arrival of three religious teachers – Rijal Abdullah, Abdul Rahman Haron and Amin 
Esa – from Indonesia.23 Though retaining a similar name to its modernist counterpart 
in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah took pains to stress its independence and its objective 
of correcting and improving Singapore's Muslim society.24 Jamiyah meanwhile, was 
founded  in  Singapore  in  1932  by the  renowned  religious  figure,  Maulana  Abdul 
Kaleem Siddiqui.25 Formed originally with the objective of countering the heretical 
Qadiani movement, Jamiyah under its chairman S.I.O Alsagoff slowly sought to steer 
the organisation towards a more active role in the Islamic matters of the Muslim 
community.26
By the 1950s and 1960s therefore, Islamic modernism was well-established in 
the Malay Peninsula. Building upon the pioneering efforts of Syed Syeikh Al-Hadi 
and the earlier reformers, modernist-oriented individuals and organizations such as 
Al-Edros, Ahmad Ibrahim, Jamiyah and Muhammadiyah continued to work towards 
their  goal  of  restoring  religious  Islamic  orthodoxy  in  the  Muslim  community. 
Moreover, the modernist mindset had permeated a larger segment of the community, 
as  more  individuals  had  begun to see  the  need to  reform a  seemingly regressive 
community. Their anxieties were apparent in their contributions to newspapers and 
23 Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied, “Sustaining Islamic activism in secular environments: The 
Muhammadiyah movement in Singapore”, Working Paper Series no. 120 (Singapore: ARI, 2009), 
p. 5.
24 Ibid., p. 6.
25 Hussin Mutalib, Islam in Malaysia: From revivalism to Islamic state (Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 1993), p. 25.
26 Shahril bin Mohd Shah, “Jamiyah: Religion and the State: 1930-1980” (Thesis (M.A.) – Dept. of 
History, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, NUS, 1996), p. 51, 69.
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magazines, as they assigned blame for what they perceived to be a lamentable state of 
affairs.
One prominent target of modernists' ire in this period were religious clerics, 
most of whom can be said to belong to the Kaum Tua. As a result of their religious 
knowledge and important roles in rituals, religious leaders such as ustazs, ulamas and 
imams had occupied prominent roles in the community both in the villages and the 
urban areas.  Modernists  however,  targeted  these religious  leaders,  criticising  their 
fixation  with  religious  rituals  rather  than  possessing  an  understanding  of  Islam's 
deeper  meaning.  Modernists  also  derided  the  practice  of  taqlid  buta or  blind 
obedience to religious rulings, while championing the use of ijtihad.27 For modernists, 
these failings characterised Islam's superficiality within the community, where even 
its  religious  leaders  possessed  only  a  shallow  grasp  of  the  religion.  Under  the 
leadership  of  these  conservative  religious  leaders,  modernists  believed  that  the 
community was only tenuously connected to Islam's ideals.
In their desire to reform society, modernists were unsparing in their criticisms 
of  the  Kaum  Tua.  Al-Edros  for  instance,  published  an  article  entitled  “Ulama 
perhatilah!” (“Scholars, please observe!”) in  Qalam's November 1952 edition, that 
blamed  narrow-minded  ulamas for  the  perceived  backward  state  of  Islam in  the 
community, and argued that ulamas continued to be led by their desires and lack of 
abilities.28 It was no longer sufficient, as Al-Edros claimed, to teach people the ways 
to carry out rituals properly. Rather, it was necessary to explain why things were to be 
done  in  a  particular  manner,  and  thereby  enabling  individuals  to  understand  the 
27 James Peacock, Muslim Puritans: Reformist psychology in Southeast Asian Islam (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978), p. 18.
28 “Ulama perhatilah!”, Qalam, vol. 28, November 1952, p. 6.
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rationale  behind Islam and its  teachings.29 Furthermore,  in  a  veiled  attack  on  the 
Kaum Tua,  Al-Edros  condemned those  who discouraged lay people  from seeking 
religious knowledge for themselves. The reason for such discouragement, Al-Edros 
insinuated, stemmed from the ulama's interest in gaining power over the laity which 
had become more important than their proper role of working for the good of the 
religion and the community. The ulama's selfishness had led to individuals becoming 
less confident in their own abilities and made them more reliant on those whom they 
perceived to be more knowledgeable.30 The alternative then, according to Al-Edros, 
was to enable the individual to acquire more religious knowledge and use his own 
mind rather  than  relying  on others.  With  these attacks  on  the Kaum  Tua,  Qalam 
sought to challenge the established religious order. By calling for a re-evaluation of 
the ulamas' position and power, its editors sought to advance the modernist agenda of 
religious renewal and the eradication of unorthodox religious beliefs and practices. 
Similar criticisms were also raised in newspapers, portraying  ulamas as too 
conservative and literalistic in their interpretations of Islam. In 1949 for instance, a 
forum writer, named 'Muslim male', doubted the effectiveness of recent measures that 
the Selangor Council of Religion adopted in granting  kathis the power to authorise 
and dismiss divorce applications. Despite the Council's well-meaning, 'Muslim male' 
believed that little would change, for the “kathi's strict adherence to the letter of the 
Koran”,  meant  that  it  was  unlikely  that  they  would  challenge  a  man's  right  to 
divorce.31 A more explicit condemnation of religious clerics took place in 1958, in 
which irate parents and kathis traded accusations over the issue of runaway brides. A 
quarrel  had broken out after  Singapore's Chief  kathi,  Hj. Ali  Salleh,  defended his 
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Muslim male, “Muslim divorces”, ST, 10 February 1949, p. 6.
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fellow kathis, claiming instead that both the parents and the girls themselves were to 
be blamed in such cases.32 The parents responded  however, by arguing that  kathis 
were not executing their responsibilities well. One parent, Hj.  Ahmad, claimed that 
his daughter had run away to Singapore, where a  kathi married her off to  her lover 
without  conducting  any  prior  investigations.33 These  open  criticisms  of  religious 
clerics highlighted the level of dissatisfaction with the behaviour of religious leaders 
and their religious interpretations. Through the newspapers, it seemed that even the 
public was now allowed to challenge their erstwhile leaders, and question the policies 
and practices which had been in place.
The  perceived  rot  was  evident  not  only  in  the  ranks  of  the  ulamas  and 
religious officials, but also throughout the community as modernists  subjected the 
ordinary  Muslim in  the  community  to  intense  criticism.  They contended  that  the 
community  had  grown distant  from the  religion,  and  parents  were  raising  future 
generations of children that would eventually lose their religious beliefs altogether. 
Some writers  evoked a  bleak  image of  a  Muslim community that  was no longer 
governed by Islam, replaced instead by one that was ruled by base carnal desires. 
These apocalyptic visions were especially evident in Qalam, which castigated parents 
for not sufficiently educating their children in religious matters. In one particularly 
passionate  piece,  Al-Edros  warned that  there  were  youths  in  the  community who 
hated  the  religion,  and  even  dared  to  proclaim  themselves  as  God.34 Modernists 
believed that without a strong foundation in religion, youths would be more easily led 
astray, and indulge in un-Islamic activities that would further weaken the community.
32 Ghazali Ismail, “Ibu2 bapa di-tudoh galakkan kahwin lari”, BH, 25 November 1958, p.1. 
33 “Gema kahwin lari – tudohan2 chief kadhi di-nafikan”, BH, 29 November 1958, p. 2.
34 “Masyarakat Islam dengan hukum agama Islam”, Qalam, vol. 147, October 1962, p. 4.
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In this too, modernists were quick to fault the established religious elite for 
letting matters deteriorate, and for their misguided attempts to rectify the situation. 
Fears of an emergence of an increasingly religiously apathetic community were given 
greater  credence  through  the  newspaper  coverage  given  to  instances  concerning 
youths' immoral activities. Stories of khalwat (proximity between a man and woman 
in seclusion) and free interaction between the two genders served to give credibility 
to the notion that youths were running rampant throughout society.35 The freedom 
which youths seemed to enjoy stoked concerns that it would eventually lead to sexual 
licentiousness, as youths were tempted to engage in premarital sex. 
As a result of these fears of rampant youthful excesses, conservative religious 
leaders adopted a hard-line stance towards such activities, and used harsh measures to 
counter these perceived immoralities. In 1960 for example, a Johor religious officer 
forced three dating couples into marriage, as they were deemed to have engaged in 
“un-Islamic”  activities.36 Though  modernists  agreed  that  measures  needed  to  be 
undertaken, they felt  that such heavy handed measures were unlikely to lead to a 
favourable  outcome.  In  criticising  the  Johor  Naib  Kathi's actions,  'Sumbangsih' 
questioned  the  efficacy  of  these  measures  in  stopping  prostitution  and  curtailing 
sexual activities in relationships. Moreover, he noted that the kathi did not explicitly 
state the activities being committed by the youths, subsumed as they were, under the 
label of “un-Islamic activities”.37 'Sumbangsih' garnered the Malayan Association of 
Youth Clubs (MAYC) Johor branch secretary Mohd Salleh's support, who felt that the 
religious department was being unjust and too strict.38 For 'Sumbangsih' and Salleh, 
35 Chamti Farouk, “Kopi pahit”, Qalam, vol. 11, June 1951, p. 33.
36 “Nikah paksa – ulasan ulama dan pemuda”, BH, 25 September 1960, p.8. 
37 Sumbangsih, “Patutkah pemuda pemudi yang berasmara di-paksa menikah?”, BH, 21 September 
1960, p. 4.
38 “Asmara- yang di-paksa dibidas”, BH, 2 October 1960, p. 5. 
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forcing  the  couples  into  marriage  had  the  effect  of  trivializing  an  important  life 
decision, that had been made before evaluating the couples' capabilities to maintain 
the  marriage.39 Despite  sharing  the  same  religious  concerns  as  the  conservative 
religious leaders, modernists nevertheless believed that a strict literalist approach to 
religion  would  do  little  to  alleviate  the  community's  social  problems.  Alternative 
measures needed to be sought which could help to reduce such unwanted occurrences 
rather than resorting to simplistic means such as marrying the lovers off immediately.
The  final  source  of  worry  for  modernists,  and  one  which  was  seen  as 
possessing  the  greatest  potential  for  causing  the  greatest  harm,  was the  influence 
Westernisation and modernity wielded. Al-Edros for instance, feared the impact of 
foreign values and practices that would further undermine a community which he saw 
as vulnerable and lacking in Islamic knowledge.40 Even as they criticised the negative 
Western influence, modernists such as Al-Edros were nevertheless aware of the need 
to learn from the West. This ambivalent attitude was a common one among Islamic 
modernists, for they were aware that though there were some benefits that could be 
derived from adopting Western ideas, there were also perils that needed to be avoided. 
Though they believed that  Western models  could be partly adapted to  an Islamic 
community, this had to be done without compromising Islamic values.41 This tension 
between Islam and modernity was evident in Qalam's pages, which carried articles on 
science  and  technology  while  also  running  articles  condemning  the  'disease'  of 
atheism  prevalent  in  the  West.42 With  increasing  exposure  to  Westernisation, 
39 Sumbangsih, “Patutkah pemuda pemudi yang berasmara dipaksa menikah?”.
Joha, “Hukuman ke atas pemuda-pemudi tidak adil”, BH, 6 October, 1960, p. 4.
40 “Islam dan dunia hari ini”, Qalam, vol. 7, February 1951, p. 10.
41 William Cooper and Piyu Yue, Challenges of the Muslim world: present, future and past  
(Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 2008), p. 239.
42 Muhammad Muhyiddin Musi, “Kewajiban ahli-ahli agama di Malaya sekarang”, Qalam, vol. 51, 
October 1951, p. 29; Abu Mansor “Jiran kita di langit”, Qalam, vol. 57, April 1955, p. 12 illustrate 
Qalam's mixed attitude towards the West. Muhyiddin criticised ulama's passiveness in the face of 
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modernists feared that Western notions regarding morality and the family were slowly 
seeping into the community, potentially displacing Islam as the source of moral and 
familial values.
In  this  light,  Islamic  modernists'  attempts  to  reform  the  Muslim  family 
stemmed from their conviction that the community was backsliding and losing its 
religious foundations. The modernist desire to re-impose their version of a pure and 
orthodox Islam necessitated an intervention into the marriage and divorce practices 
which they saw as no longer  being in  accordance with proper  Islamic principles. 
Polygamy, early marriages and the abuse of divorce thus came under the modernists' 
targets because they were seen as spiralling beyond the limits of Islam, and required 
immediate attention. These problems had occurred under the Kaum Tua's watch, and 
a new modernist approach was therefore needed since the old ways were uneffective. 
Women's movements in the Malay Peninsula
While the Islamic modernist movement had a long pedigree in Singapore, in 
contrast the women's movement appeared only after World War Two. Under British 
colonial rule, especially in the early twentieth century, women had begun to acquire 
greater opportunities that gave them glimpses of alternatives to the traditional ways of 
life. The Japanese Occupation meanwhile, caused great upheavals in the community, 
breaking  down barriers  that  had  previously  constrained  women.  In  this  post-war 
period, the emergence of women in the public sphere took several forms; manifesting 
itself in the political, social and religious fields. As with Islamic modernists, rather 
than forming a cohesive body, there existed a diversity of thought amongst Muslim 
Western influence in Malaya while Abu Mansor described the technological advances made in the 
field of astronomy by Western scientists.
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women as they pondered their role in society. This ideological diversity was evident 
in  feminists' attempts to expand women's rights. The various feminists organisations 
found themselves  not  only clashing  with  men  but  also  with  other  feminists  who 
possessed differing views on the nature of women's rights in the community and also 
the means of acquiring these rights.  
The emergence of women's movements as a force in political activism was 
born primarily from the politicised anti-colonial sentiments that pervaded the Malay 
Peninsula in the post World War Two period. As part of their anti-colonial struggle, 
the various political parties recognized the importance of garnering as broad a support 
from  the  Muslim  community  as  possible.43 The  necessity  of  acquiring  women's 
support  was  however  counterbalanced  by a  patriarchal  hierarchy which  relegated 
women to the periphery of the public sphere, and baulked at the idea of allowing 
women a greater public role. 
To reconcile this  dissonance,  rather than bringing women into the political 
fold  as  members  of  the  main  political  party,  the  parties  sought  to  win  women's 
support through the establishment of women's wings. While allowing women some 
semblance of participation in the political sphere, in reality, women's issues took a 
back-seat to women's utility as valuable votes and a means of mobilizing the parties' 
political machinery.  For instance, the first President of the Malay Nationalist Party's 
women wing Angkatan Wanita Sedar, Aishah Ghani claimed that the MNP's president 
Ahmad Boestamam “was interested in women for political reasons, to add strength to 
the party in order to push for independence. Women's issues as such did not exist in 
43 Sharifah Zaleha binti Syed Hassan, “Strategies for public participation: women and Islamic 
fundamentalism in Malaysia”, in The freedom to do God's will: religious fundamentalism and 
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1946.”44 The experiences of women in other women's wings such as UMNO's Kaum 
Ibu UMNO (founded in 1947) and PAS' Dewan Muslimat (founded in 1953) were no 
different.  Kaum Ibu was the brainchild of three women – Puteh Mariah; Zainab bte 
Abdul Mariam, and Saleha bte Mohamed Ali, with Puteh Mariah bringing the idea to 
UMNO President Datok Onn's attention. The women however, faced opposition from 
within UMNO's ranks who were against allowing women's participation in politics. It 
was only with Datuk Onn's  strong support that  they were able  to  push their  idea 
through.45 Moreover, as in the case of Kaum Ibu UMNO, the early founding members 
of these women wings were usually the spouses of party members, further placing the 
women's wings in a subsidiary and non-antagonistic position.46 The women's wings 
thus functioned as a supporting appendage to the main party's activities, with their 
activities  limited  to  fund-raising  and  logistics  rather  than  political  agitation  and 
raising awareness of women's issues.47 Despite women's entry into the public sphere 
with the creation of women's political wings, their emergence was tempered by the 
limited role that the dominant patriarchal hierarchy allowed women to play.
At the same time as women acquired some political roles, women's welfare 
organizations also emerged during the post-World War Two period that were directed 
towards the betterment of womankind. These organizations were founded with the 
aim of helping less fortunate women overcome their plight which these organisations' 
members felt were a consequence of the moral problems prevalent in the community. 
One such organisation in  Singapore was the Malay Women's Welfare Association 
44 Virginia H. Dancz, Women and party politics in Peninsular Malaysia (Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), p. 86.
45 Ibid., p. 89.
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(MWWA) founded by Che Zahara binte Noor Mohamed in October 1947. Che Zahara 
was  not  a  newcomer  to  social  welfare  and activism in  the  public  sphere,  having 
already  been  involved  in  political  activism  through  her  position  as  treasurer  in 
Angkatan Wanita Sedar.48 The MWWA was popular with educated women, attracting 
eighty  members,  including  fifty  teachers,  immediately  after  its  founding.  The 
MWWA's main objective, according to Che Zahara, was marriage reform, which she 
felt  were  necessary  due  to  the  widespread  practice  of  divorce  in  the  Muslim 
community that had left women to fend for themselves after being deserted by their 
husbands.49 Additionally, through the establishment of a fund, the MWWA strove to 
assist women and couples who wished to get married.50 With its strong emphasis on 
marital issues and its desire to strengthen marriages, the MWWA became an ardent 
advocate for the woman's cause.
Another  woman's  organisation  which  flourished  was  the  Young  Women's 
Muslim Association  (YWMA) formed by Mrs  Mohamed  Siraj  and  other  Muslim 
women in 1952. Similar in nature to the MWWA, the YWMA sought to promote 
women's  participation  in  Singapore's  social,  economic  and cultural  fields.51 At  its 
inception, the YWMA managed to attract fifty members to its cause, and by 1963, this 
number  had  increased  to  three  hundred.52 Taking  up  the  position  of  Honorary 
Secretary  in  the  YWMA's  founding  committee,  Mrs  Siraj  worked  tirelessly  to 
improve  the  woman's  lot  in  Singapore.  As  with  the  MWWA,  Mrs  Siraj  and  the 
YWMA attempted  to  reach out  to  the  public  through educational  campaigns  and 
social welfare projects. With the founding of these two organisations, women could 
48 “Malay women seek marital reforms”, ST, 12 October 1947, p. 5. 
49 Ibid.
50 “Malay women to form welfare body”, SFP, 9 October 1947, p. 5.
51 “A fuller life for Muslim women”, ST, 28 February 1963, p. 12. 
52 Ibid.
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work towards their aim of eradicating the perceived injustices against women and 
help their fellow sisters in their times of need.
Unlike  Islamic  modernists,  these  women's  associations  were  not  averse  to 
working with non-Muslims and secular organisations. The feminist fight in Singapore 
transcended ethnic and communal barriers, as feminist activists frequently cooperated 
with one another towards achieving their goal. This close cooperation was further 
solidified through the Singapore Council of Women's (SCW) founding in 1952. The 
impetus for SCW's formation came from a speech that the wife of Sutan Shahrir gave 
in October 1951 before seventy Malay women and ten men, in which she spoke about 
the  progress  in  women's  rights  in  Indonesia.53 Inspired  by  her  speech,  several 
activists,  including  Che  Zahara,  gathered  to  discuss  the  efforts  of  existing  social 
welfare associations. Seeing that these associations were insufficient, they agreed to 
form an umbrella organisation that “would not overlap the work and activities of the 
existing social welfare organisations, but go to the root of all the social evils that exist 
and handicap the progress of women.”54 
The  SCW's  multi-ethnic  and  multi-religious  hierarchy  reflected  the 
organisation's  nature  as  a  cross-communal  collaboration  amongst  feminists.  Its 
honorary secretary Shirin Fozdar was born in India and adhered to the Baha'i faith, 
while Che Zahara  later became one of its two vice-presidents. By reaching out to 
individuals beyond the Malay-Muslim community, Che Zahara was able to draw on a 
wider network and more resources than that available to the MWWA had it stood by 
itself. Also, SCW and its non-Muslim members were more than willing to take the 
Muslim community to task for its treatment of women. Shirin Fozdar especially, as 
53 Phyllis Chew, The Singapore Council of Women and the women's movement (Singapore: AWARE, 
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will  be  seen  in  the  following chapters,  was  unafraid  to   comment  on  the  family 
reforms that were being mooted in the Muslim community.
Besides these organizations, activists also used newspapers and magazines as 
a way to push for the advancement of women's causes. From time to time,  Qalam 
allowed female local and foreign guest writers the opportunity to publish articles on 
topics related to women's issues. In 1955 for instance, Qalam published an account by 
Maryati Adnan, an Indonesian female activist, regarding her experiences attending the 
World  Muslim  Conference  and  her  views  on  woman's  emancipation.55 Qalam's 
willingness to host these articles illustrated the existence of some common grounds 
shared by these two reformist groups. Additionally, women actively participated in 
debates and discussions taking place within the newspapers' pages. Female readers 
such as 'Wan Arpah' and 'Wan Faridah' were adamant on the need for family reforms, 
and  offered  their  suggestions  to  resolve  the  community's  problems.  Nevertheless, 
there  were  also  instances  when feminists  faced opposition  due  to  the  views they 
espoused, particularly as their desire to challenge men were not appreciated by some 
of their  adversaries during these debates. The space which was given to feminists 
through these print outlets thus did not go entirely unchallenged.56
Lastly, female religious leaders (ustazahs) also contributed their input to the 
marriage and divorce debates. The same factors which allowed modernists access to 
air  their  views  were  also  utilised  by  ustazahs to  air  their  interpretations  of  the 
religion. Using their religious knowledge, these  ustazahs challenged the established 
religious  and  cultural  practices  which  they  believed  were  oppressing  rather  than 
55 Maryati Adnan, “Suruhanjaya wanita di muktamar pemuda Islam sedunia”, Qalam, vol 55, 
February 1955, pp. 36-37.
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empowering women.  Ustazah Umm Muhsin for instance, used her monthly column 
entitled  “Hak dan kebebasan wanita”  (Women's  rights  and freedom) in  Qalam to 
comment  on  women's  issues,  taking  aim  at  both  conservative  males  and   other 
feminists whom she felt were operating beyond the pale of Islam. 
The existence of these diverse groups had a great bearing on women's roles in 
the debate surrounding marriage and divorce. The  ustazah's opposition to feminists 
highlights that despite both parties' desire for immediate family reform, their views on 
the eventual nature of the benefits that women deserved differed. Women were not 
only at odds with the men whom they saw as oppressing them, but also with one 
another. Moreover, in their attempts to address the family crisis in the community, 
women often had to battle against the aspersions cast on their religious knowledge. At 
times,  even  ustazahs would  find  their  religious  knowledge  and  interpretations 
questioned and summarily rejected. Umm Muhsin for instance, crossed swords with 
the Mufti of Johor who disagreed with her views on women's rights in Islam, going so 
far as to claim that individuals like Umm Muhsin who sought to change the laws of 
Islam  would  be  condemned  to  Hell  in  the  afterlife.57 Moreover,  feminists  were 
targeted for their seeming adherence to foreign ideas that seemed to be contrary to 
Islam,  especially  given  their  alliance  with  non-Muslim  feminists.  Despite  their 
differing stances however, these different groups were clear in their belief that the 
situation in the Muslim community was highly unfavourable to women. A patriarchal 
society  had,  in  their  view,  kept  women  oppressed  and  seized  the  rights  which 
feminists argued had been granted by Islam. Only through a thorough revision of the 
existing affairs could women be restored to their proper position. To achieve this aim, 
women targeted the family in order to grant women their long deserved rights.
57 “Fatwa Mufti Johor”, Qalam, vol. 20, March 1952, pp. 8-10, 31-34.
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Conclusion
The appearance of Islamic modernists and feminists in the Muslim community 
highlighted the presence of a mode of reformist thinking which sought to challenge 
the  existing  practices  and  customs.  The  emergence  of  Islamic  modernism in  the 
Middle East in the late nineteenth century had its effects in the Malay Peninsula, as 
the  ideas  Arab  Islamic  modernists  espoused  began  to  influence  their  Muslim 
counterparts in the region. Modernists focused on correcting the family unit, which 
they saw as dysfunctional  and prone to abuses which had not  been sanctioned in 
Islam. Meanwhile, Muslim feminists benefited from both British colonial rule and the 
impact of Islamic modernism. The relative openness of British colonial  society in 
Singapore  allowed  Muslim  women  a  greater  public  role,  while  the  changing 
conditions in post-World War Two Singapore gave women further advances in the 
political  arena.  With  their  expanded  social  and  political  roles,  women  sought  to 
address the long-standing problems and abuses which they believed were afflicting 
women in the Muslim community. The attempts by these two groups to bring changes 
into the family unit will be the subject of the following chapters.
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Chapter Two
The Laycock Bill: Limiting child marriages
One of the earliest battles to reform the family that involved modernists and 
feminists  occurred  in  1950 with  the  move towards  creating  a  legislative  bill  that 
would end marriages between individuals below a certain age. The Laycock Bill, as it 
was called, proposed to implement an age limit of sixteen for those who intended to 
marry. This chapter will analyse the reasons behind the Laycock Bill's formulation, 
coming so quickly after the resolution of a highly contentious child marriage that 
occurred in Singapore in 1950. As will be seen, this marriage, between a young girl 
named Maria Hertogh and her older husband, and its chaotic aftermath, became a 
pretext to press for immediate changes in order to prevent such re-occurrences. Even 
so,  events  concluded  contrary  to  their  expectations,  with  the  Muslim community 
being excluded from the bill.
The Maria Hertogh controversy
The young girl at the centre of the storm was of Eurasian descent and had 
originally been raised as a  Catholic  and given the name Maria  Huberdina Bertha 
Hertogh  by  her  parents,  Adrianus  and  Adeline  Hertogh.  The  Japanese  invasion 
however,  broke the family up and in  order  to  protect  their  children,  Adeline sent 
Maria to live with one of her mother's friends, Che Aminah.1  After the war ended, 
Maria's parents conducted a search for their daughter and with the Dutch Consulate's 
help, discovered that Maria was living in Trengganu. Che Aminah had raised Maria as 
1 Haja Maideen, The Nadra Tragedy: The Maria Hertogh controversy (Petaling Jaya, Selangor: 
Pelanduk Publications, 2000), p. 31.
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a Muslim and had given her a Muslim name, Nadrah. Her biological parents and the 
Dutch Consulate pressed for Maria's return, arguing that Che Aminah's adoption of 
Maria had no legal basis.2 The roots of this conflict lay in the system of “informal 
adoption”, which had been a common practice throughout the Muslim community,3 
and  this  practice  was  challenged  through  the  legal  system.  Due  to  certain  legal 
irregularities  however,  the  Court  rejected  the  initial  suits  lodged  by  the  Dutch 
Consulate in April and May 1950, putting an end to any immediate resolution and 
Maria returned to her foster parent Che Aminah's care.4 It transpired a few months 
later,  in  August  1950,  that  the  thirteen-year-old  Maria  was  to  be  married  off  to 
Mansoor Adabi, a twenty-one year-old teacher. The controversy that ensued over this 
proposed marriage set into play the chain of events that would lead to the Laycock 
Bill.
Modernists and child marriages
News  of  the  marriage  was  not  entirely  welcomed,  with  a  Straits  Times 
editorial  noting that  “the news of  Maria's  marriage  has  caused very unfavourable 
comment among all communities, and not least among responsible elements of Malay 
public opinion.”5 Stating its stand on the matter very clearly, the editorial declared 
that
it cannot possibly be right to let a Dutch child of fourteen 
to make such a fateful choice herself  –  and nobody who 
really cared for her own happiness, as distinct from his or 
her own wishes, would allow her to do so.6
2 Ibid., p. 60.
3 Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied, Colonialism, violence and Muslims in Southeast Asia, p. 16.
4 Tom Eames Hughes, Tangled Worlds: The story of Maria Hertogh (Singapore: ISEAS, 1980), pp. 
32-33.
5 “A Wedding”, ST, 5 August 1950, p. 6. 
6 Ibid.
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Several letters from Muslim readers mirrored the editorial's stance, with one letter 
calling for changes in order to prevent similar such occurrences.7 The marriage of the 
young  Maria  seemed  to  offend  the  sensibilities  of  these  individuals,  with  some 
Malays and Muslims feeling that the move was ill-advised and improper. Even Al-
Edros,  who had been an ardent  defender  of Che Aminah,  questioned the motives 
behind the marriage, wondering whether it was merely a tactic to ensure that Maria 
was returned to Che Aminah.8 Thus, with her marriage to Mansoor Adabi, an already 
sensational case was now given further fuel, and it was in this highly volatile context 
that the first battle for reform of the Muslim  family can be better understood.
The MAB's chairman S.I.O Alsagoff's response to the Straits Times' editorial 
and other similar pieces marked an attempt to reconcile a changing attitude towards 
child marriage with the allowance of marriages soon after undergoing puberty under 
Islamic law. While agreeing that Islam allowed youths to marry after experiencing 
puberty,  the  emphasis  was  shifted  away from purely physical  change towards  an 
individual's emotional and mental maturity. As Alsagoff stated, “it would have been 
much better if she had been advised to wait until she was more mature in mentality 
and  personality  before  making  a  decision  for  marriage.”9 Alsagoff's  stand  on  the 
matter  mirrored  similar  arguments  that  occurred  in  other  Islamic  countries  that 
defined legal majority not through attaining puberty but from developing the required 
intellectual capability.10 Furthermore, Alsagoff accepted the possibility of instituting a 
minimum marriage age that could serve to discourage child marriages. Pointing to 
7 Abu Bakar bin Ahmad, “Maria Hertogh: A Malay view”, ST, 5 August 1950, p. 6. M.Z.; “From a 
Malay”, ST, 10 August 1950, p. 6.
8 “Nadrah, anak angkat yang menggemparkan”, Qalam, vol. 2, September 1950, p. 29.
9 “S.I.O. Alsagoff, Maria Hertogh's marriage: A Muslim view”, ST, 10 August 1950, p. 6. 
10 Kecia Ali, Marriage and slavery in early Islam (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2010), p. 62.
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Egypt as an example, he argued that it had already instituted some forms of limitation 
on child marriage by prohibiting marriages below sixteen, with offenders running the 
risk of imprisonment.11 
Modernist  developments  elsewhere  in  the  Muslim  World  were  a  clear 
influence in Alsagoff's arguments. His use of the Egyptian example highlighted his 
awareness that limits had already been instituted on child marriages. Moreover, by 
using the Egyptian legal precedent, Alsagoff sought to pre-empt criticisms that he was 
introducing new measures without any basis in Islam. He further claimed that though 
Islam allowed marriage after puberty, “rulers and governments, can in the interest of 
the people's welfare, legislate and limit the marriage age,”12 using an argument which 
had also been used by Egyptian modernists in advancing their restrictions on child 
marriages.13 Alsagoff was confident that his proposal would win the support of many 
within  the  community,  believing  that  “among  all  educated  people  of  the  Islamic 
religion in this country there is no dispute that a girl is far too young to become a 
wife”, and that there would therefore be “a good deal of support for any proposal to 
fix a later marriage age by law.”14 In the highly charged atmosphere in the midst of 
the Maria Hertogh controversy, Alsagoff's forceful public advocacy for the restriction 
of under-age marriages marked a significant moment in the drive to reform the family 
unit. 
Feminists had also espoused a stand similar to Alsagoff's position. Even before 
Alsagoff's  publicly  expressed  sentiments  about  the  possibility  of  implementing 
changes in the allowable marriage age for the Muslim community, Che Zahara had 
11 “S.I.O. Alsagoff, Maria Hertogh's marriage: A Muslim view”, ST, 10 August 1950, p. 6. 
12 Ibid.
13 John Esposito and Natana J. Long Bas, Women in Muslim family law, p. 50.   
14 “The Child Bride”, ST, 15 August 1950, p. 6. 
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already advocated for such a change. During the association's inaugural meeting in 
1947, Che Zahara declared that the MWWA had several marriage reforms in mind, 
and criticised the practice of forced marriages of young fifteen-year-old girls to old 
men which  had brought  “untold  misery to  for  the  poor  woman”.15 As  part  of  its 
campaign  to  educate  the  community  about  the  injustices  contained  within  these 
customs, the association staged plays based on the experiences of women who had 
been mistreated by their husbands.16 Pledging to hold such plays on a monthly basis, 
Che Zahara believed that it would help to educate more women and set them on a 
better  path.17 The  association's  use  of  plays  as  a  medium to  attack  the  marriage 
customs was motivated by its potential to strike a deep impact on its audience, as 
evident  from Che  Zahara's  claim  that  “the  moral  of  a  play  on  a  stage  is  more 
educative than any other medium of instruction.”18 She also took every opportunity to 
publicise the cases handled by her association, describing for instance, the case of a 
fifteen-year-old girl who became suicidal after being forced to marry a fifty-year-old 
man.19 By staging these public attacks on the perceived injustices that were being 
committed against women, Che Zahara and the MWWA sought to raise greater public 
consciousness on the urgency of family reforms. 
Despite these assertions by modernists and feminists, the impetus for reforms 
came not from within the community itself, but from the colonial government. Less 
than a month after Alsagoff's statements, the government began to put into motion 
legislation that would limit marriage ages. After much anticipation, from both Muslim 
and non-Muslim communities, the Legislative Councillor John Laycock proposed a 
15 “Malay women to fight prejudice”, ST, 20 October, 1947, p. 5. 
16 “Protest on Malay marriage customs”, ST, 9 June 1948, p. 3. 
17 “Malay plays attack tradition”, ST, 12 January 1948, p. 5. 
18 Ibid.
19 “Winning the fight against divorce”, ST, 12 September 1948, p. 7. 
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Marriage Bill that would prohibit marriages of persons under the age of 16.20 The 
events  surrounding  Maria's  marriage  played  a  part  in  the  bill's  formulation,  as 
Laycock admitted during a Legislative Council session that  
I could not be sure that public opinion was the same the same as 
my own opinion  on this  matter  until  about  two months  ago 
when an event happened... drew the attention of the public to 
the undesirability of girls being allowed to marry at the age of 
12 or 13.21
Thus, the publicity surrounding Maria's marriage proved to be a lightning rod 
for sentiments surrounding the practice of child marriages within Singapore's Muslim 
community. It provided, for all parties involved, an opportunity to advance their own 
agendas. Modernists and feminists saw the marriage as an indictment of the Muslim 
community's religious and social customs and urged the adoption of a new Islamic 
perspective  that  turned  away  from  outmoded  practices.  Feminists  however  went 
further, seeing child marriages as emblematic of an unjust society that continued to 
oppress women. The state, as characterised by John Laycock, seemed to be driven by 
a desire to minimise the possibility of any colonial-colonialised admixture that could 
have been injurious to their colonial prestige. The marriage between the thirteen-year-
old Maria and her older husband had placed the issue of child marriages firmly in the 
public's consciousness.
Responses to the Laycock Bill
The proposed Laycock Bill immediately drew widespread criticisms from the 
Muslim  community,  and  some  modernists  too  expressed  their  concern.  The 
conservative Chief Kathi Hj. Ali condemned the bill, claiming that it was contrary to 
20 “Move to ban child weddings”, Singapore Free Press (SFP), 28 August 1950, p. 5. 
21 “Age of Marriage Bill (2nd Reading)”, in Proceedings of the First Legislative Council, Colony of  
Singapore 3rd Session, 1950 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. B381- 382,
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Islamic  teachings  which  allowed  a  girl  to  marry  when  she  reached  the  age  of 
puberty.22 Even  Alsagoff,  the  original  proponent  for  controlling  child  marriages 
expressed his disfavour. He argued that there was a difference between the Egyptian 
example and the Laycock Bill, with the latter going further by making making under-
age marriage illegal altogether rather than merely restricting its practice.23 Al-Edros 
too  weighed  in  on  the  matter,  broadly  expressing  his  agreement  with  the  points 
forwarded by Alsagoff and Hj. Ali. Edros further expressed concerns on the apparent 
interference in Muslim affairs,  claiming that if  the bill  was successfully passed it 
would  signify  the  colonial  authorities'  subjugation  of  Islam  in  Singapore.24 The 
modernists' opposition to a reform, which seemingly offered a resolution to an issue 
that they had previously criticised, reflected their uneasiness with the suddenness of 
the proposal and its heavy-handedness. Coming on the back of the ongoing struggle 
over Maria Hertogh, it seemed to herald a further assault on Islam and the Muslim 
community in Singapore. 
Although modernists were wary of the Laycock Bill, feminists seemed to be 
the only group that backed the bill. The MWWA enthusiastically expressed its support 
for the bill, seeing it as the first step towards women's emancipation and a tangible 
attempt  at  ridding  the  community  of  a  major  social  problem.  According  to  Che 
Zahara,  child  marriages  were not  only against  the tenets  of  Islam but  one of  the 
reasons for the community's backwardness, and the Bill would go some way towards 
resolving this problem.25 Abu Bakar Ahmad meanwhile, who had previously written 
in to comment on Maria's marriage, questioned the opposition's claims that the Bill 
22 “Bill on marriage 'against Islam'”, ST, 31 August 1950, p. 8. 
23 “Bid to ban child marriage gazetted”, ST, 2 September 1950, p. 7.
24 “Laycock membangkitkan perasaan Islam”, Qalam, vol. 3, October 1950, p. 3.
25 “Woman say: Abolish child marriages”, ST, 16 October 1950, p. 7.
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was “un-Islamic” and argued that it would not violate any religious principles.26
Feminists' support for the bill however, proved to be insufficient. With both 
influential  Islamic  modernists  and  conservatives  expressing  their  unhappiness, 
Laycock was forced to amend it by adding an amendment stating that the bill would 
“not apply to marriages of persons celebrated in accordance with the Mohammedan 
religion between persons professing that religion.”27 Under the revised Laycock Bill, 
the restriction on marriages for under-aged individuals would not apply to Muslims.
Feminists expressed their discontent with Laycock's capitulation. Che Zahara 
deemed  this  volte-face to  be  unacceptable,  and  sought to  reverse  Laycock's 
compromise. Going against conservatives and  modernists, Che Zahara called for a 
public meeting to discuss the need for such a limitation on marriage ages. Stressing 
that she was not challenging Islamic law, she insisted that Muslim authorities had to  
use their judgement when dealing with marriages cases, given the precarious social 
situation in the community.28 
The  MWWA-sponsored  public  meeting  to  discuss  child  marriages  drew 
immense  public  interest.  Held  at  the  Singapore  Volunteer  Corps  Drill  Hall  along 
Beach Road on 15 October 1950, the meeting was attended by three hundred women 
and  one  hundred  men,  including  notable  male  figures  such  as  the  Legislative 
Councillors  Sardon  Jubir  and  Lim  Yew  Hock  sitting  on  the  Select  Committee 
debating the Laycock Bill.29 Che Zahara used the meeting as a platform to plead for 
the reinstatement of Muslims in the Laycock Bill, and portrayed child marriages as a 
practice that was responsible for the community's social and economic backwardness. 
26 “”The Laycock Bill”, ST, 12 September 1950, p. 6.
27 “New bill exempts Muslims”, ST, 8 September 1950, p. 8. 
28 “Muslim brides' ages – Meeting called”, ST, 9 September 1950, p. 7. 
29 “Women say: Abolish child marriages”, ST, 16 October 1950, p. 7. 
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Shirin Fozdar meanwhile, called on women to embrace education and attacked the 
“reactionaries” whom she claimed “had been playing upon your [women's] gullible 
nature and have taken advantage of your ignorance”.30 To provide a more emotional 
aspect to the issue, former child brides, such as nineteen-year-old Hamida were given 
the opportunity to share their experiences and add their voices to the chorus against 
child marriage. MWWA's success in organizing the meeting certainly illustrated the 
women movement's ability to mobilize its supporters and create a stir in the public 
sphere. Despite the movement's ambitions however, it failed to persuade Laycock and 
the colonial government to backtrack on the amendment excluding Muslims from the 
bill.
An early defeat for reformism
The conclusion of the debate over the Laycock Bill pointed to the existence of 
multiple sites of tension within the Muslim community. The struggle was not only 
between the forces of Islamic reformism but also seemed to lie in a gender battle, as 
women  challenged  men's  patriarchy  and  dominance  within  the  family  unit.  This 
section  will  analyse  the  reasons  behind  the  failure  and  the  shortcomings  of  the 
reformers, as control of the issue proceeded largely beyond their immediate control. 
The  Laycock  Bill  controversy  demonstrated  firstly,  Islamic  modernists' 
tenuous grip on Islamic affairs  in the Muslim community.  Though they sought  to 
change existing practices, their success in doing so often depended on the actions of 
other  actors.  In  this  instance,  modernists  demands  for  an  end  to  child  marriage 
became identified with the Laycock Bill which was seen as an attack on the Islamic 
religion and its teachings. The rapidity with which the Laycock Bill was introduced 
30 Ibid.
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raised suspicion within a community that was already hurting from the perceived 
injustice  of  the  case.  As  a  result,  Alsagoff's  suggestions  failed  to  convince  the 
majority of the community, and the question of child marriages was left in abeyance 
during the 1950s.
Furthermore, modernists were no longer the only voice for reform within the 
Muslim community. The emergence of Muslim feminism after the Second World War 
now openly emerged to challenge modernists and men over the direction of any future 
social changes. With the greater opportunities offered after the war and the presence 
of  determined feminists  such as  Shirin  Fozdar  and  Che Zahara,  women  were  no 
longer willing to remain as quiet and passive onlookers in matters which had a direct 
impact on their lives. The Maria Hertogh controversy gave feminists the opportunity 
to stake their claim in these domestic matters and influence events towards their own 
objectives. Men however, were unwilling to shed the initiative to these feminists, and 
attacked their religious knowledge and even their personal character.31 The intrusion 
of feminists  into a  previously male-dominated arena was not  welcomed,  and men 
responded by attempting to re-subjugate these women who had refused to accept their 
allotted place in the community.  
Despite their entry into the public sphere, the fallout from the Laycock Bill 
also highlighted the weaknesses inherent in the feminist movement. They struggled to 
shed the negative impression that they had within the community. Despite their efforts 
to  educate  the public  about  women's  issues,  the feminist  movement failed to  win 
widespread support from the community. There were hardly any visitors attending the 
plays that the MWWA organised, even though the plays had been publicised in the 
31 Christina Wu, “Under the skin: Colonial-local anxieties of the domestic realm in the Maria Hertogh 
controversy” (Academic Exercise- Dept. Of History, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National 
University of Singapore, 2009), p. 32.
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newspapers. A play staged to raise funds for a Muslim Girl's Trade School drew a 
grand total  of seven attendees, as a Chinese individual who passed by the event's 
venue attested. In his letter to the Straits Times, he claimed that the play's high ticket 
prices  were the main reason that  deterred Malays  from attending these plays.  He 
therefore suggested that Che Zahara “charge prices which are within the means of the 
wage  earners  of  the  Malay  community”  in  order  to  capture  the  attention  of  the 
segment of society which was most in need of such moral lessons.32 This piece of 
anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that  the  MWWA was  unable  to  generate  sufficient 
support for their cause beyond the small group of women making up the association's 
membership.  While  the  high  ticket  prices  may  have  had  a  dampening  effect  on 
attendance, it also highlighted the lack of enthusiasm for the MWWA's campaign.
The apathy the community displayed was also engendered by the negative 
impression which Che Zahara had created because of her confrontational approach. 
She did not  hesitate  to  bring  the association to  the fore of  any public  event  that 
occurred in Singapore, attracting the ire of conservatives and modernists perturbed at 
her lack of propriety. For instance, despite the association being barely a month old, 
Che Zahara was adamant that the MWWA would partake in the public processions 
celebrating Princess Elizabeth's marriage to Lieutenant Philip Mountbatten.33 Several 
community leaders immediately opposed Che Zahara, and  managed to successfully 
bar the MWWA from carrying out its intent. In turn, Che Zahara did not take kindly to 
their interference. In a letter to the Straits Times criticising the decision, Che Zahara 
mentioned  the  names  of  prominent  individuals  and  organisations  such  as  Ahmad 
Ibrahim, the President of the Young Men's Muslim Association; Abdul Majeed, the 
32 Chinese observer, “Malay support for Malay charities”, ST, 16 January 1948, p. 4. 
33 Timothy N. Harper, The end of empire and the making of Malaya (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 71.
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President of the Indian Muslim Association; and Sardon Jubir, the President of the 
Singapore Malay Union, whom she claimed were among those who had protested 
against the MWWA's planned procession.34 Che Zahara's criticism directed towards 
the  key  figures  in  the  community  certainly  did  little  to  enhance  her  credibility. 
Instead,  they  viewed  her  as  a  destabilising  and  confrontational  figure  who  was 
overstepping social and religious boundaries with her outlandish actions. 
Even sympathetic women were concerned about the MWWA's actions. In her 
Straits Times forum letter, 'Gadis Melayu' criticised the MWWA's decision to carry 
out the procession. She questioned the MWWA's motives, believing that the money 
could  be  channelled  to  more  pressing  needs,  such  as  an  anti-Tuberculosis  fund. 
Furthermore in her opinion, progress could be made without resorting to “post-war 
ideas”  and  “stereotyped  shouts  like  'emancipation'”.35 Ustazah Umm  Muhsin 
meanwhile dismissed the use of plays  as a pedagogical tool  towards the eventual 
abolition of unjust practices. Such events she averred, were for the feminists' own 
benefits rather than for the good of womankind. Furthermore, taking umbrage at their 
seeming attack on Islam and its laws, Umm Muhsin insisted that the fault lay with 
ulamas and kathis' greed for money, and parents' ignorance that made them ignore the 
proper Islamic practices.36 Sharing a similar mindset with modernists, Umm Muhsin 
argued  that  proper  Islamic  education  and  upbringing,  rather  than  plays  and 
entertainments  were  the  means  by  which  ignorance  could  be  eradicated.37 Their 
concerns with the MWWA's methods illustrates the challenges that MWWA faced. 
Having already incurred  the  wrath  of  male  religious  and community leaders,  the 
34 N.M. Zahara, “Battle of the sexes: A modern Malay woman in a Man's world”, ST, 27 November 
1947, p. 6. 
35 “Emancipation of Malay womanhood”, ST, 1 December 1947. p. 4. 
36 Umm Muhsin, “Hak dan kebebasan wanita”, Qalam, vol. 4, November 1950.  p. 13.
37 Ibid.
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MWWA was also unable to count on unqualified support from women. 
Feminists' poor reputation meant that instead of winning people to their cause, 
the  MWWA-organised  mass  meeting  only  served  to  reinforce  the  organisation's 
radical image and failed to bring about any substantial change beyond creating more 
controversies. The mass meeting suffered from accusations that it was Che Zahara's 
personal  vehicle  to  broadcast  her  vision of  the  women's  cause,  rather  than  as  an 
avenue for an open discussion.38 Che Zahara also received letters urging her to focus 
her attention on other worthwhile issues such as prostitution.39 Al-Edros went further 
in his condemnation of Che Zahara. Publishing a picture of the meeting's happenings, 
he accompanied it with a caption stating that the picture who were supporting the 
event were apostates.40 M.J. Namazie meanwhile, took offence with Shirin Fozdar's 
interference in an ostensibly Islamic issue. Responding to Fozdar's remarks on the 
Islamic faith and its treatment of women, Namazie claimed that Fozdar had “every 
reason to be bitter towards the Muslims”, imputing that her preoccupation with Islam 
stemmed  from the  prosecution  of  her  fellow  Baha'is  by  Muslims  in  her  Persian 
homeland, rather than from more altruistic motives.41 Hence, rather than consolidating 
support for the bill through the meeting, MWWA's highly public move drew further 
criticisms for its radical founder. It allowed their opponents to question their Islamic 
credentials, especially in a community in which the sight of women openly agitating 
for change and challenging the religious elite's authority was rare. In the dominant 
patriarchal society, women were not allowed to speak for themselves and could not 
challenge men's social and religious supremacy.
38 “'Had no chance to give views' Malay women on child marriage”, ST, 19 Oct 1950, p. 5. 
39 “Muslim reformer urged to desist”, ST, 2 November 1950, p. 5. 
40 Qalam, vol. 5. December 1950, p. 1.
41 “'No bill can abolish child marriages', Muslim reply to Mrs. Fozdar”, ST, 13 November 1950, p. 4. 
55
The MWWA's failure to reverse the changes in the Laycock Bill illustrated the 
problems faced by the women's movement in the early 1950s. They had correctly 
foreseen  the  importance  of  the  court  of  public  opinion  and  therefore  sought  to 
establish a strong public presence. Unfortunately, the manner in which Che Zahara 
sought to establish the MWWA's public presence proved to be too controversial for 
the community to stomach. Her open criticism of the religious elite earned her the 
antipathy  of  the  conservatives  while  her  support  of  a  bill  which  modernists  and 
conservatives  had  disavowed  meant  that  she  was  largely  an  isolated  figure. 
Furthermore,  the MWWA's inability to unite women in support of the bill  further 
hampered the MWWA's ability to be an influential voice, despite the publicity which 
they  attracted.  As  a  result  of  these  shortcomings,  the  MWWA  proved  too 
inconsequential  a  movement  in  their  attempt  to  reinstate  the  limitations  on  child 
marriage as proposed in the original bill.
Conclusion
The Laycock Bill can be seen as a failure for all parties involved. Modernists 
found their agenda hijacked by a state which had its own interests in mind with the 
institution  of  a  minimum  marriage  age.  Feminists  meanwhile,  found  themselves 
unable to persuade the state to reverse its course and reinstate Muslims in the Bill 
which had been changed under intense pressure from the Muslim community. The 
struggle between these three actors, did not end however with the Bill's passing in 
1951. Other issues that would emerge as sites of contestations as the state, modernists 
and feminists vied for control over the direction of marriage and divorce reforms in 
the Muslim community. 
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Chapter Three
The Syariah Court and the Woman's Charter
The  tussle  for  control  over  the  direction  of  social  reform  in  the  Muslim 
community did not end with the Laycock Bill. In the later part of the 1950s, feminists 
and modernists clashed once again over the formation of the Syariah Court and the 
implementation of the Women's Charter. These two issues revealed the continuation 
of the different approaches that had been adopted by the two reformist groups, and 
their differing vision on the nature of social reforms that were seen as necessary for 
the community. Yet, unlike the Laycock Bill which did not present any clear victors, 
these two issues heralded the decline of feminism as a reformist  force within the 
Muslim community.
The clamours for a Syariah Court
The  Laycock  Bill  had  demonstrated  to  reformers  the  inadequacies  of  the 
existing  institutions  administering  Islam within  the  Muslim community.  The only 
body that could come closest to claiming such a role was the MAB, which suffered 
from several limitations. First formed in 1915 and initially called the Mohammedan 
Advisory Board, before switching its name to the Muslim Advisory Board after World 
War  Two,1 the  Muslim  Advisory  Board's  limitations  largely  stemmed  from  the 
purpose behind its  formation.  It  had been established as a  response to the Sepoy 
Mutiny in Singapore in February 1915, which alarmed the British and demonstrated 
1 Shahril Mohd Shah, “From the Mohammedan Advisory Board to the Muslim Advisory Board”, in 
Malays/Muslim in Singapore: Selected readings in history, 1819-1965, ed. Khoo Kay Kim, Elinah 
Abdullah and Wan Meng Hao (Subang Jaya, Selangor: Pelanduk Publications, 2006), pp. 159, 176.
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to  them Islam's  possible  role  as  a  destabilising  social  factor.2 Created  under  this 
limited  premise,  the  MAB  especially  in  its  early  pre-World  War  Two  years, 
functioned within its advisory role to the British Government. Consequently, this led 
to  criticisms  on  the  Board's  role  and  function  in  the  Muslim  community.  Some 
doubted its right to represent the Muslim community, while others were dissatisfied 
with its lack of powers.3 Chamti Farouk for instance, had some harsh words for the 
Board in a 1951  Qalam article,  labelling it  as useless and better  off being closed 
down.4 Suggestions for alternatives or improvements to the Board were however left 
un-entertained by the British who having achieved their aim, had no interest in getting 
dragged into an internal dispute within the community despite their awareness of the 
ill-feeling against the Board.5 Under these conditions, the impetus for reform could 
not come from the Board, but from outsiders such as John Laycock while modernist 
organisations were hampered by their distinct lack of power to enact changes of their 
own.
The  lack  of  a  regulatory  body  hampered  not  only  reformers'  ability  to 
introduce  reforms but had, in their opinion, also contributed to the chaotic state of 
Islam in Singapore. The ones who were at fault according to modernists, were the 
predominantly Kaum Tua kathis and ustazs who were guilty of practising a backward 
interpretation of Islam and prioritised financial gain over the community's welfare. 
The hostility to  kathis was  evident  in  Chamti  Farouk's  story of  a  friend's  chance 
encounter with a kathi. The friend had asked the kathi where he was staying, and the 
2 Ibid., p. 166.
3 Moshe Yegar, Islam and Islamic institutions in British Malaya (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1979), 
pp. 105, 108.
4 Chamti Farouk, “Kopi pahit”, Qalam, vol. 16, November 1951, p. 3. 
5 Moshe Yegar, Islam and Islamic institutions in British Malaya, p. 108.
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kathi replied that he was “staying behind the jail with monkeys.”6 Chamti condemned 
the  kathi's insulting remarks, claiming that this condescending attitude towards his 
fellow Muslims was responsible for the  kathi's haphazard execution of his duties. 
This lackadaisical attitude allegedly allowed men to take advantage of the situation by 
shopping  around  for  the  kathi most  favourable  to  their  requests.7 Chamti  further 
claimed that it  was common knowledge that  kathis made their  livelihood through 
officiating marriages and divorces, and that it was in their self-interest to maximise 
their income rather than ensure that proper procedures were followed. Others in the 
community shared Chamti's contempt for kathis, for complaints had  been aired in the 
newspapers  about  the  arbitrary  charges  that  kathis imposed  for  their  services.8 
Without a regulatory body to check the excesses and abuses of their positions by these 
religious figures, the possibility of changing existing practices became an even more 
arduous task for reformers. 
The solution to this dilemma, for both modernists and feminists, lay in the 
formation of a Syariah Court and the appointment of a  Mufti which could become 
authoritative bodies in  the regulation of Islam in Singapore.  A Syariah Court that 
would  exercise  powers  over  marriage  and  divorce  and  provide  a  uniformity  in 
religious  administration  would  be  a  powerful  way  to  enact  social  and  religious 
reforms. Once again, this idea was lifted from existing practices in other parts of the 
Muslim World. In Egypt, Syariah Courts had been created with powers over personal 
and family law in 1897, while other aspects of the law continued to be prosecuted 
under the civil code.9 Ahmad Ibrahim was among those calling for a Syariah Court, 
6 Chamti Farouk, “Kopi pahit”, Qalam, vol. 16, November 1951, p. 3. 
7 “Muslim law court for colony”, ST, 14 January 1952, p. 7.
8 “Kathis accused of charging 'exorbitant' rates”, ST, 29 July 1955, p. 8.
9 Hanan Kholussy, “Interfaith unions and non-Muslim wives in early twentieth-century Alexandrian 
Islamic courts”, in  Untold histories of the Middle East: Recovering voices from the 19th and 20th 
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giving  it  a  greater  degree  of  authority  by virtue  of  his  position  as  a  Nominated 
Legislative  Councillor.10 Feminists  too,  saw  a  Syariah  Court  as  a  key  means  of 
solving the moral and family problems occurring in the community. They advanced 
similar  arguments,  claiming  that  it  would  check  abuses  by  errant  husbands  who 
wished  to  abandon  their  wives  and  also  parents  who  married  their  daughters  off 
against her will. Che Zahara was among those who wished for the establishment of 
such a Court, making her feelings on the matter apparent as early as 1951.11 In Che 
Zahara's  view,  the  Court's  establishment  would  act  as  a  “deterrent  against 
indiscriminate  divorces  by  Muslims”.12 M  Siraj  meanwhile,  attributed  the  high 
divorce rate to the “lax administration of Muslim law and the absence of any attempt 
towards reconciliation”.13 In this issue, both modernists and feminists agreed on the 
need for a court that could deal with these pressing matters in a more authoritative 
manner.
These demands came to fruition in 1954 when the government expressed its 
willingness to create a Syariah Court to regulate Islamic affairs. Much of the debate 
on the shape of the future Court occurred in the legislative arena, though input from 
Muslim religious  organisations  were  often  sought.  Muslim leaders  also  formed  a 
working committee of their own composed of individuals such as Ahmad Ibrahim, 
M.J. Namazie and Abu Bakar Pawanchee that studied the government's proposals.14 
These  deliberations  led  to  the  creation  of  the Muslim  Ordinance  (1957),  which 
established a Syariah Court with an Al-Azhar educated scholar, Taha Suhaimi as its 
centuries, ed. Amy Singer, Cristoph Neumann and Selcuk Aksin Somel (New York: Routledge, 
2011), p. 56.
10 “He asks for court to cut divorces”, ST, 21 July 1954, p. 4.  
11 “Religious court urged for S'pore”, ST, 16 February 1951, p. 4. 
12 “Malay women want a marriage court”, ST, 12 February 1954, p. 5. 
13 M Siraj, “The Shariah Court of Singapore and its control of  the divorce rate”, Malaya Law Review 
5, 1 (1963), p. 150.
14 “A new move to cut that high divorce rate”, ST, 28 January 1955, p. 7.
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first President.15 Under the Ordinance, the Syariah Court was charged with control 
over the registration of divorce and marriages. Complaints over the kathi's behaviour 
were also addressed in the Ordinance, with the powers of appointing kathis placed in 
the Governor's hands and requiring  kathis to appear before a Magistrate's Court to 
register their handled cases on a monthly basis.16 With these changes, the problems 
that had previously stood in the reformists' way were less of an obstacle, and boosted 
their efforts. By capitalising on the community's widespread dissatisfaction with the 
existing  haphazard  system,  reformers  managed  to  push  for  the  creation  of  an 
institution that would prove to be critical for their reformist efforts.
Jousting for positions in the Syariah Court
Though modernists and feminists possessed a shared aim in their desire for the 
Syariah's  Court  establishment,  the  cordiality  between  both  parties  did  not  last. 
Quarrels soon emerged as both parties sought to claim credit for the court's creation. 
Shirin Fozdar fired the first salvo,  claiming the Court as a victory for the SCW's 
campaign in their fight against polygamy.17 Her claims were firmly rejected by S.I.O. 
Alsagoff, who claimed  instead that the MAB had been the prime mover behind the 
Court's founding.18 The bad blood between the modernists and feminists, which had 
been temporarily allayed over the common cause of the Syariah Court, emerged once 
again. 
These  antagonisms  were  further  compounded  when  feminists  made  public 
their  expectations  for  the  proposed  Court.  Feminists  attempted  to  build  on  their 
15 “Govt. picks Islam court president”, ST, 22 Oct 1958, p. 4. 
16 Hooker, Islamic Law in South-East Asia, p. 103.
17 “Mahkamah Shariah kejayaan isteri”, BH, 6 September 1957, p. 2.
18 “Shariah 'big step for equal rights': Divorce will be harder now”, ST, 11 September 1957, p. 9..
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expanding role by demanding that women be given positions within the Syariah Court 
administrative system. A Straits Times letter from 'Muslim Woman' first floated the 
idea of women's representation in the working committee that had been established by 
the Muslim organisations, reminding them that women should also have a voice in 
such discussions. In her opinion, it was only “just and right ... that they be permitted 
to voice their opinion in a matter which concerns them most”.19 Shirin Fozdar echoed 
these calls a few months later when she expressed her hopes that women could not 
only be represented in the Muslim Law  Court Committee tasked with deliberating 
over the Court's  structure but also occupy positions in  the future Syariah Court.20 
Presumably, Shirin Fozdar had in mind positions in which women could have a direct 
effect on the troubled families that would come before the court. Women could then 
play a central role in charting the future direction of the family unit in the community. 
Fozdar was not the only one to call for women representatives in the Court. Similar 
demands  were  later  made  by  Kaum  Ibu UMNO and  YWMA,  seeking  to  secure 
positions on the Court's Marriage Appeal Board.21 
Feminists' demands were deemed however, to be too excessive and provoked 
an indignant response from several parties. Declaring that women were “sentimental 
and we should not allow sentiment to rule in court proceedings”, Chief Kathi Hj. Ali 
firmly expressed his lack of confidence in women's abilities to adjudicate cases in a 
satisfactory manner.22 Qalam's columnists too expressed their doubts regarding the 
women's  religious  knowledge.  In  Edros'  view,  women  had  no  intrinsic  right  to 
representation on the Appeals Board and argued that there were no female religious 
19 “Women want a voice in war on divorce”, ST, 12 February 1955, p. 12.
20 “Mixed marriages: make sure your man is a bachelor”, ST, 27 September 1955, p. 6. 
21 Chamti Farouk, “Kopi pahit”, Qalam, vol. 66, January 1956, p. 1.
22 “Men only, says kathi: women for appeal board? No, they're too sentimental”, ST, 19 December 
1955, p. 4. 
62
leaders sufficiently qualified to sit on the board.23 The Muslim Advisory Board which 
had  previously  assented  to  a  female  representative  in  the  Muslim  Law  Court 
Committee  tasked  with  deliberating  over  the  Court's  powers  and  structure,  also 
dismissed the move by feminists to secure  positions in the Syariah Court, providing 
the similar excuse that “the work of judging in court is for men and not women”.24 
The  consistency  in  these  responses  highlighted  the  patriarchal  nature  of  the 
community  which  continued  to  insist  on  propagating  the  existing  gender  roles. 
Placing women in a position to pass judgement on men would have allowed women 
to  play the  same roles  as  men.  Doing so  would  undermine  the  notion  of  gender 
complementarity in which women and men had their particular roles. 
This  assessment  of  women's  capabilities  predictably  drew  an  immediate 
response  from  feminists,  who  did  not  take  kindly  to  having  their  religiousness 
questioned once again and being stereotyped as overly emotional women. Mrs Siraj 
countered that Hj. Ali had no right to question women's religious knowledge, given 
Hj.  Ali  and his  peers'  culpability  in  the  community's  high  divorce  rates.25 Shirin 
Fozdar meanwhile, characterized Hj. Ali as “narrow minded” for refusing to accept 
the possibility of women in the Syariah Court's Appeal Board. Pointing to the strides 
women had made in professional occupations in other countries, Fozdar declared that 
there were women whose religious knowledge surpassed men's.26 Refusing to accept 
their  opponent's  aspersions,  feminists  challenged  the  men's  right  to  religious 
orthodoxy  and  sought  to  highlight  their  credentials  to  justify  their  desire  for 
representation in the Court. 
23 “Rang undang kahwin Islam”, Qalam, vol. 66, January 1956. p. 4.
24 “Shariah 'big step for women'”, ST, 11 September 1957, p. 9. 
25 “2 women laugh at kathi”, ST, 21 December 1955, p. 4. 
26 “Kathi challenged”, ST, 28 December 1955, p. 6. 
63
Despite  their  counter-claims,  women  failed  to  secure  their  position  in  the 
court's executive or legal apparatus. The post of Syariah Court President went to Hj. 
Taha Suhaimi while Chief Kathi Hj. Ali continued in his existing position. Feminists 
also failed to muster support for their bid to sit on the Marriage Appeal Board as no  
woman was appointed to the Appeal Board, which was composed instead of familiar 
male figures such as S.I.O Alsagoff, Ahmad Ibrahim and M.J. Namazie.27 The sole 
consolation for feminists came much later with Mrs Siraj's appointment as the Syariah 
Court's social worker and counsellor in 1960.28 
The patriarchal Malay community was a major factor for feminists' failure to 
acquire some form of institutional power within the Muslim community. Though they 
had recognised the benefits that the Court could bring towards the resolution of the 
family crisis, and had been one of its major supporters together with modernists, their  
support came to nought as men resisted feminists' attempts to play a more meaningful 
role  in  the  community.  Giving  women  a  position  of  control  within  the  Court's 
administrative body or Appeal Board would have meant giving a woman power to 
exert power over men in domestic matters, which would have reversed the proscribed 
gender  roles  in  the  community.  Even  modernists  partook  in  this  gender  bias,  for 
whom strengthening the family seemed to mean boosting the woman's role within the 
family unit only without expanding her rights and privileges in the society.
The Women's Charter
Even though Muslim feminists were becoming increasingly marginalised in 
the community, at a national level, the feminist movement in Singapore was gaining 
27 “Lembaga rayuan Islam di-pileh”. BH, 4 February 1959, p. 2.
28  “A move to reduce the divorce rate among state Muslims”. SFP, 10 October 1960, p. 3. 
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in strength. The introduction of the Women's Charter in 1961 marked the culmination 
of the feminist movement's efforts to implement a set of legal reforms that would 
secure women's rights in Singapore. Though the SCW and Shirin Fozdar's efforts in 
lobbying political  parties and community leaders  were important for the Charter's 
eventual creation, it would not have been possible without the support of key male 
individuals  such  as  Ahmad  Ibrahim.  The  Charter  provided  among  other  things, 
security  for  women  in  the  event  of  a  divorce  and  also  prohibited  polygamy  in 
Singapore. Unfortunately these reforms, which feminists had desired for a long time, 
had, as with the earlier Laycock Bill, excluded the Muslim community. Unlike the 
Laycock Bill however, this oversight did not incur the wrath of Muslim feminists, but 
was instead a development which they assented to.
The SCW's success lay partly in its efforts to cultivate international support 
for its ideas. To advance its cause, the SCW saw fit to engage with other like-minded 
organisations around the world. Through its participation in international bodies such 
as  the  International  Council  of  Women  (ICW),  the  SCW  kept  itself  abreast  of 
developments in other countries and spread awareness of conditions in Singapore to 
their international counterparts.29 Upon obtaining news of developments worldwide 
that could help to advance the woman's cause in Singapore, the SCW was quick to 
publicize  the  information  to  the  local  press.  As  with  its  affiliate  organisation  the 
MWWA,  the  SCW recognized  the  importance  of  getting  its  message  out  to  the 
general public. By doing so, the SCW alerted these international organisations to the 
situation in Singapore, and at the same time, drew local inhabitants' attention to the 
strides made by women in other countries.
29 “SCW to President, International Council of Women”, 6 January 1959, cited in Phyllis Chew, The 
Singapore Council of Women, p. 7.
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Yet,  the  feminist  movement's  success  in  the  eventual  establishment  of  the 
Women's  Charter  was not  won through the  battle  of  the hearts  and minds of  the 
populace. It came instead through the political arena. After failing to push for the 
legislation of a “Singapore Prevention of Bigamous  Ordinance” that the SCW had 
drafted and presented to various parties in 1954, the SCW found a more amenable 
listening ear in the PAP during the 1959 Legislative Assembly elections. The SCW's 
anti-polygamy  stand  resonated  with  the  PAP's  women  wing,  the  PAP  Women's 
League, and both parties worked together to push for the adoption of the Women's 
Charter.30 The efforts put in by both groups and the PAP's desire to capture women's 
votes in the upcoming elections saw the PAP publish a manifesto that promised to 
introduce an anti-polygamy legislation and other measures improving women's status 
if the party were to win the election.31 By winning the PAP over in support of ending 
polygamy, the SCW gained a powerful ally that could be in a position to enforce the 
changes.
The PAP's comprehensive victory in the 1959 elections, which could be partly 
attributed to the support that it drew from women, placed the party in prime position 
to  implement  its  campaign  promises,  including  those  related  to  the  ending  of 
polygamy. Women appreciated the party's desire to raise women's status in Singapore, 
lauding the party as having “both the courage and the intelligence to recognise the 
value of women's votes”.32 The 1959 elections also saw four women being elected 
into political office, including the first Malay-Muslim female legislator, Sahorah bte 
Ahmat. These new female legislators were closely allied to the feminist cause, with 
30 Diane K. Mauzy and Robert Stephen Milne, Singapore politics under the People's Action Party 
(London: Routledge, 2002), p. 42.
31 Stephanie Lawson, “Patriarchy and resistance in Singapore”, in Women, activism and social  
change, ed. Maja Mikula (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 11.
32 Manisah Parbury, “Hard and bitter fight for women's rights”, ST, 11 July 1959, p. 8. 
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Chan Choy Siong especially,  working hard to push forward the Charter's eventual 
establishment. Having obtained their mandate to rule, the PAP sought to fulfil its pre-
election promises and worked towards the crafting of the Women's Charter.
The Women's Charter that was finally passed in 1961 marked a triumph for 
Singapore's feminist movement as it contained most of the reforms that they had long 
desired. The Charter's enactment abrogated the various religion-based marriage and 
divorce ordinances  previously governing the family,  and replaced it  with a  single 
uniform set of laws.33 This change, according to Choy Siong, would “enable women 
to  have  their  rights  safeguarded  by  legislation,  and  to  give  people  far-reaching 
stability in marriages”, which had not been possible under the customary laws.34 The 
most  significant  change under  the charter  was the abolition of  polygamy,  making 
monogamy the only permissible mode of marriage in Singapore,35 which was clearly 
targeted against the polygamous practices within Singapore's various religious and 
ethnic  communities.  Furthermore,  the  Charter  affirmed  women's  rights  to  seek 
maintenance from their husbands, allowing women to turn to the law courts for a 
maintenance order if she fulfilled the necessary conditions.36 With these changes, it 
appeared that the women's movement in Singapore had scored a significant victory.
Crucially however, as with the Laycock Bill, the Charter excluded Muslims 
from its regulations; a privilege that had not been accorded to the other religions in 
Singapore.  Though pleased with the Charter's progress, the SCW was nonetheless 
dismayed  at  the  Muslim community's  omission.  Upon receiving  news of  Muslim 
33 Leong Wai Kum, Family law in Singapore, p. 10.
34 Singapore Legislative Assembly Debates Official Report, 6 April 1960, vol. 12, no. 7 cols 438-490, 
cited in Leong Wai Kum, Family law in Singapore: Cases and commentaries on the Women's  
Charter and family law (Singapore: Malayan Law Journal, 1990), p. 11.
35 Ibid., p. 40.
36 Ahmad Ibrahim, Family law in Malaysia and Singapore (Singapore: Malayan Law Journal, 1984), 
p. 69.
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women's exclusion, Shirin Fozdar expressed her disappointment but at the same time 
vowed to continue her fight to convince Muslims that polygamy was a practice that 
was not encouraged by their religion.37 In contrast,  Shirin Fozdar's stance was not 
shared by Sahorah Ahmat, whom as the Straits Times noted, had not “questioned the 
exclusion  of  the  Muslim faith  from the  marriage,  rights  and  duties,  divorce  and 
maintenance provisions of this Women's Charter.”38 Sahorah's silence on this issue 
was striking, for she was not oblivious to the problems that Muslim women faced in 
their lives. In fact, Sahorah later sought to introduce a bill that would protect Muslim 
women's rights to maintenance in the event of a divorce, illustrating the importance of 
women's  welfare  to  her.39 The  protests  against  the  exclusion,  thus  seemed  to  be 
sustained only by non-Muslim feminists, while the response from Muslim feminists 
was almost non-existent.
The reluctance  to  endorse the  SCW's  campaign to  end polygamy was not 
because of a belief that polygamy was a benign practice that did not harm women. On 
the contrary, Muslim women  were all too aware that polygamy placed women in a 
precarious  position  within  a  marriage,  for  a  man  could  arbitrarily  marry  another 
without the wife's knowledge. Women were unwilling to acquiesce to this unfairness, 
and as with the non-Muslim SCW feminists, Muslim women were similarly vocal on 
the  abuse  of  polygamy in  the  community.  A sense  of  admiration  for  the  SCW's 
campaign for instance, can be detected in a  Qalam article by the female columnist 
Ros Hanum, who referenced the ongoing battle against polygamy as one way through 
which women could restore order to the community and push against the chaos that 
37 “One-wife law: She praises S'pore govt”, SFP, 21 July 1959, p. 5.  
38 “With this ring”, ST, 8 April 1959, p. 6. 
39 “Muslim wives in Singapore ask for legislation to protect their welfare”, ST, 4 March 1960, p. 15. 
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Westernisation brought.40 There were also women who expressed their  support for 
Shirin Fozdar and the SCW in their letter to the newspapers, urging Fozdar onwards 
despite the obstacles that the SCW faced.41 
In their criticisms of polygamy, local Muslim women did not have to fight 
alone,  adopting  a  similar  tactic  as  the  SCW  by  looking  for  support  beyond 
Singapore's  shores.  For  instance,  the  prominent  Indian  Muslim  feminist,  Begum 
Hamid Ali's visit to Singapore drew intense public attention, due to her efforts in 
India to promote women's rights and her support for monogamy.42 Her visit created 
controversy when she immediately launched into an attack on polygamy and clerics 
in her first press conference upon her arrival in Singapore. In her trenchant critique, 
Begum Hamid Ali characterised most contemporary religious leaders as men who 
were “half-educated, very conservative and search the scriptures to prove their point.” 
She further extended her criticism to men in Singapore for indulging in polygamy.43 
With  these  open  attacks  against  polygamy,  Muslim  feminists  demonstrated  their 
displeasure with the injustices that men had subjected their women to through their 
abuse of a religiously sanctioned practice. Women would not remain silent in the face 
of the oppression by errant husbands.
Despite this shared affinity on the ills of polygamy, Muslim women and the 
SCW diverged on the measures needed to deal with the practice. Few were willing to 
countenance  as  extreme  a  measure  as  polygamy's  abolition.  Even  Che  Zahara, 
Fozdar's ally in the women's struggle, disapproved of Fozdar's plans to stop Muslim 
men from marrying more than one wife as she felt that it was a practice allowed under 
40 Ros Hanum, “Alam wanita: Kaum ibu dan pertubuhan-pertubuhannya”, Qalam, vol. 102, January 
1959, p 12.
41 “Providence fund and inheritance law”, ST, 16 February 1957, p. 10. 
42 “50 years of work for woman”, SFP, 11 February 1955, p. 7.
43 “One wife is plenty, says Begum”, ST, 13 February 1955, p. 5. 
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Muslim law.44 Thus, Muslim feminists were not against polygamy per se, for they 
accepted its place in Islam, but took issue rather with its application and abuses in the 
community.  As  with  the  problem  of  child  marriages,  the  fault  lay  not  with  the 
religion,  but  with men who were unable to  rein in  their  desires.  As Mrs Aminah 
Jumabhoy, a supporter of the Women's Charter explained “many Muslim husbands 
find it convenient to consider only the part of Muslim law that allows four wives and 
to disregard the conditions.”45 Sahorah also adopted a similar attitude, which could 
explain her previous silence. In her arguments in favour of her proposed maintenance 
bill,  Sahorah noted that polygamy was allowed under certain conditions, although 
“many men never keep the Muslim law properly, and the result is that we women 
always suffer.”46 By ascribing blame to men rather than the religion, Muslim women 
avoided questioning the need for polygamy in their community. The solution to the 
issue  of  polygamy,  would  therefore  not  lie  in  its  abolition  but  rather,  through  a 
regulatory system that could ensure that it would not be easily abused by men. 
In this  instance therefore,  Muslim feminists  were reluctant  to  push for the 
extension  of  family  reforms  won  under  the  Women's  Charter  into  the  Muslim 
community.  Though  appreciative  of  the  benefits  that  the  Charter  would  bring  to 
women, Muslim feminists baulked at its restriction on polygamy, which ran counter 
to  their  religious  beliefs.  The  problem,  as  they  argued,  lay  in  the  abuses  of  the 
practice, and to entirely abolish it would have represented an attempt to change the 
laws in Islam. A set of family reforms was thus willingly passed over by the Muslim 
feminists. With this split  in opinion between Muslim feminists  and the SCW, this 
44 “Malay wives not against bigamy”, SFP, 13 May 1953, p. 3.
45 “Women hail one-wife plan”, ST, 3 July 1959, p. 7. 
46 “Muslim women wives in Singapore ask for legislation to protect their welfare”, ST, 4 March 1960, 
p. 15.
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meant  that  there  was  little  pressure  for  the  Government  to  extend  the  Women's 
Charter over the Muslim community. 
Conclusion
By the end of the 1950s, the reformist initiative clearly lay with the Muslim 
modernists. Their successful attempt to monopolise the key positions in the Syariah 
Court  afforded them the  institutional  means  to  implement  their  reformist  agenda. 
Muslim feminists in contrast, had seen their own attempts to seek Court positions end 
in  failure,  with  the  only  consolation  coming  from Mrs  Siraj's  appointment  as  a 
counsellor. Moreover, with the establishment of the Women's Charter, it seemed that 
the  Muslim community  was  once  again  excluded  from family reforms  that  were 
taking place in Singapore. This time however, Muslim feminists acquiesced in the 
exclusion,  doing  little  to  back  the  SCW and  non-Muslim  feminists'  attempts  to 
challenge the exclusion. In doing so, they helped to bring about their own intellectual 
marginalisation in the community. By refusing to endorse the efforts by the SCW and 
Shirin Fozdar concerning the Women's Charter, Muslim feminists failed to capitalise 
on  the  advances  made  by  women  in  the  other  communities.  Lastly,  with  Shirin 
Fozdar's departure from Singapore's shores in 1961 and the closing of Che Zahara's 
MWWA in 1960, Muslim feminism lost its two most ardent advocates.47 The impetus 
for  social  and family reform in the  Muslim community now lay largely with the 
Islamic modernists, which as will be seen in the following chapter, did not hesitate to 
utilise their newly-won powers.
47 “A S'pore women's assn dissolved”. ST, 2 July 1960, p. 4; “She leaves Singapore with regrets”. ST, 
25 April 1961, p.  10.
71
 Chapter Four
The State: From non-interference to regulation
Even though the feminist challenge receded in the Muslim community, it did 
not mean that modernists had a free reign in implementing their own set of reforms. 
Despite  being  largely  in  control  of  the  Islamic  reform  agenda  in  Singapore, 
modernists  continued  to  face  considerable  resistance  from  conservatives  and  the 
Muslim community. This was apparent in the reactions that modernists encountered 
as they attempted to utilise their new found positions of power in the Syariah Court to 
their  own advantage.  Consequently,  their  failures meant that modernists  could not 
take  a  dominant  role  in  the  creation  and  enforcement  of  new  Islamic  rules  and 
regulations  on  marriage  and  divorce.  It  was  left  to  the  state  to  take  control  of 
proceedings and direct the pace of social change in Singapore's Muslim community. 
Once ensconced in their control of the Syariah Court, some modernists sought 
to utilise its power to limit polygamy. In the modernists' view, the practice had its 
roots in humanitarian concerns over the welfare of women and children left behind by 
their martyred men but had come to be abused by some Muslim men. As modernists 
made clear, the fault lay not with the religion, but with its adherents' attitude. In a 
defence of polygamy's place in Islam, 'Aware Muslim' argued that “polygamy should 
not  be  condemned unconditionally,  but  should  be  minimised  to  to  meet  practical 
necessities  and  certain  human  considerations.”1 Though  polygamy  was  not 
widespread in the Malay Peninsula and Singapore,2 it nevertheless came under attack 
from modernists, for it was a glaring example of the community's disregard for proper 
1 “Polygamy's place in Islam”, ST, 26 June1951, p. 6. 
2 Judith Djamour, Malay kinship and marriage in Singapore (London: Athlone Press, 1965), p. 83.
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Islamic doctrine.  The restrictions that  were supposed to be placed on men before 
allowing them to contract a second marriage were laxly applied,  allowing men to 
indulge their base desires without thinking about the impact on their existing families. 
The solution lay in using the Syariah Court to implement stronger controls on 
polygamy by limiting men's power to contract second marriages. The impetus came 
from none other than the Court's President, Inche Taha. In August 1960, Inche Taha 
suggested that a husband should be made to obtain permission from his wife and the 
Syariah Court before being allowed to marry a second wife. Only after a certificate 
had been issued by the Registrar of Muslim  Marriages could a  kathi officiate the 
polygamous marriage.3 After receiving the support of several Muslim leaders, Taha 
proceeded to take  decisive steps  against  polygamy.  In December  1960,  the Court 
started issuing marriage certificates which included a stipulation allowing a woman to 
seek divorce in the event that the husband contracted a second marriage.4 A woman 
who was displeased with her husband's desire for a second wife, was now granted 
automatic passage out of her marriage. 
Taha's  attempt  was  met  with  opposition  from  the  community.  The  new 
stipulation did not go down well, for many were taken by surprise by the suddenness 
of its introduction. Qalam was among the dissenters, as Chamti had earlier expressed 
his  disagreement  when  Inche  Taha  first  raised  his  proposed  reforms  in  August. 
Chamti  had  countered  that  the  stipulation's  introduction  would  harm  rather  than 
protect a woman's welfare and rights. According to Chamti, a woman with children to 
care for, would bring more misfortune to herself if she exercised this right to divorce, 
leaving her with little means of support.5 Once the stipulation was introduced, Qalam 
3 “Poligami puncha cheraian – Taha”, BH, 13 Aug 1959, p. 1.
4 “Kerana 'Ta' Sah'”, BH, 9 Jan 1960, p. 5.
5 Chamti Farouk, “Kopi pahit”, Qalam, vol. 113, December 1959, p.  2.
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repeated Chamti's claims, while also attacking the stipulation's validity in Islamic law. 
Al-Edros took offence with the stipulation's compulsory nature which forced all men 
to  allow their  wives  the  rights  to  divorce,  and  turned  to  other  jurisprudists  who 
viewed such stipulations  as  either  “sunnah” or  “makruh”.6 Under  the  intensifying 
pressure, the Court was forced to recall all the newly printed marriage contracts. In its 
aftermath,  Attorney-General  Ahmad  Ibrahim  blamed  Taha  for  the  entire  fiasco, 
claiming that Taha had inserted an “unauthorised” clause without going through the 
proper legal and administrative procedures.7 Ahmad Ibrahim also revealed that Taha 
had been replaced as the Syariah Court President in December, with his position taken 
over by his deputy, Hj. Sanusi.8 Thus, even though Taha attempted to use the Syariah 
Court as his means of bringing forth reforms of the family, it ended in failure for his 
modernist cause.
Where previously modernists  had failed in their  attempts to  limit  marriage 
ages  due to  a  lack  of  power  to  implement  change,  Taha's  failure in  this  instance 
illustrated  the  importance  of  winning  the  community's  support.  Taha's  moves 
illustrated his willingness to use the Court as the means of bringing forth reforms in 
the  Muslim  family.  Though  the  modernist  drive  for  change  could  now  be  done 
through official channels, and not only through open discourse, modernists such as 
Taha  were  still  unable  to  win  the  community  over  to  their  reforms.  Despite 
controlling the institutional power of the Syariah Court, they were unable to utilise it 
effectively. To grant women more power in marriage at men's expense was a highly 
unpopular move, and it was reflected in the reactions to Taha's reforms. The failure 
6 “Taklik dipaksakan?”, Qalam, vol. 114, January 1960, p. 3. Sunnah means a practice which is 
encouraged while makruh is a practice which is although not sinful, is discouraged.
7 Ibid.
8 “Hakim Syariah letak jawatan”, BH, 9 January 1960, p. 5.
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was  also  partly  due  to  Taha  himself,  for  even  before  the  issue  of  the  marriage 
stipulation, he had already raised a few ideas that were regarded with suspicion.
The furore over the marriage stipulation was not the first time that Taha had 
his views on the family unit subjected to intense criticism. Earlier the same year, he 
stoked similar criticisms when he expressed his support for couples to get to know 
each other before marriage.9 His support for a practice which seemed to come from a 
modern Western mode of thinking rather than one grounded in Islam undermined his 
authority as an Islamic leader, despite his position as the Syariah Court President. A 
Malay  newspaper,  Utusan  Melayu,  had  launched  a  campaign  publicising  his 
controversial views, ridiculing Taha further due to Taha's claim that he had forgotten 
the title of the book from which he had adopted  these ideas.10 Qalam meanwhile, 
published 5,000 pamphlets attacking Taha that were distributed in various mosques 
around Singapore.11 Coming so soon after his controversial  remarks on premarital 
dating,  the  introduction  of  the  divorce  stipulation  on  the  marriage  contract  was 
inevitably  seen  as  further  proof  of  Taha's  liberal  un-Islamic  ethos.  The  marriage 
stipulation foundered under the unfavourable reputation of its sponsor. 
Taha Suhaimi's failure and resignation in the same month as his introduction 
of the new marriage certificates illustrated the challenges that modernists continued to 
face after their ascendancy and acquisition of control of the Syariah Court. The Chief 
Kathi Hj. Ali's public opposition to his superior's reforms was a continuation of the 
battle between modernists  and conservatives'  interpretations of Islam. The Muslim 
community meanwhile,  reacted  adversely to  a  seemingly radical  move  to  change 
9 “Ta' salah gadis bertemu teruna sa-belum kahwin”, BH, 20 February 1959,p. 2.
10 “Dari sebulan ke-sebulan”, Qalam, vol. 110, September 1959, p. 6. 
11 “Pendapat hakim mahkamah Syariah Singapura bertentangan dengan ajaran Islam”, Qalam, vol. 
110, September 1959, p. 7.
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existing cultural and religious practices. Consequently, modernists attempts to turn 
the Syariah Court into a reformist tool for the reformation of marriage and divorce 
failed to materialise.
British colonial policy towards Islam
The failure of modernists to push through reforms on their own left the state as 
the only viable actor. While the state had exhibited a willingness to intervene in the 
affairs and practices of a community when necessary, the extent of the state's activism 
in  the  Muslim  community  exceeded  that  of  its  approach  towards  the  other 
communities.  This  differing  treatment  of  Islam vis-a-vis  the  state  was not  a  new 
phenomenon  which  occurred  only  after  Independence.  Rather,  the  eventual 
assimilation of Islam into the state bureaucracy first began during the British colonial 
period and reached its conclusion with the formation of the Syariah Court and MUIS 
as Islamic religious institutions created for the administration of Islam under the state.
While  the  British  colonial  government's  attitude  towards  the  practice  of 
religion  in  the  Malay Peninsula  was  ostensibly one  of  religious  non-interference, 
British  colonial  policy  had  wide-ranging  effects  on  the  Muslim  community.  In 
Singapore, the foundations of a non-interference attitude towards Islam was enshrined 
from the  start  of  the  British  flag's  early incursions  into  the  island,  as  seen  from 
Raffles' assertion in 1823 that “in all cases regarding the ceremonies of inheritance, 
the laws and customs of the Malays will be respected where they shall not be contrary 
to  reason,  justice  and humanity.”12 The  British  authorities'  desire  for  a  hands  off 
approach was conditioned by their  belief  that Islam did not pose a threat to their 
12 Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman, “Muslim-non-Muslim marriage in Singapore”, in Muslim-non-muslim 
marriage: political and cultural contestations in Southeast Asia, ed. Gavin Jones, Chee Heng Leng 
and Maznah Mohamad (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), p. 284.
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political authority, reducing the need to enforce changes in the religion's practice.13 
Consequently,  the British attempted to  refrain from imposing any changes  on the 
Muslim community that  would have impinged on the community's  practice of  its 
religion and Islamic personal law. Ideally, Muslims would remain as the sole arbiters 
on the nature of Islamic beliefs, its laws and practice. 
In reality however, the British desire to refrain from passing judgement on 
Islamic personal law was impossible to maintain, especially with the expansion of the 
colonial state into all aspects of its subject's life. The enactment of legislation such as 
the  1880  Mohammedan  Marriage  Ordinance,  while  being  “largely  procedural  or 
administrative in nature” as M.B. Hooker notes,14 nevertheless placed Islamic law 
within the ambit of the colonial legal structure. The evolution of the kathi's position 
within the colonial structure and the regulation of marriage and divorces also clearly 
highlighted  the  state's  increasing  expansion  into  previously  independent  Islamic 
institutions and practices. Under Part II of the Ordinance, the Governor of the Straits 
Settlement took over the role of appointing individuals as  kathis and empowering 
them to carry out the marriage and divorce cases coming before them. At this point in 
time  however,  the  registration  of  these  marriage  and  divorce  cases  were  on  a 
voluntary basis, and did not have to be registered with the Muhammadan Registers 
that came into being under Part I of the 1880 Ordinance.15 With the 1923 amendment, 
the state expanded further towards regulating Islam. The registration of marriages and 
divorces  were  made  compulsory,  with  a  fine  of  $25  for  non-compliance.  Kathis 
13 Redzuan Othman, “The Middle East influence on the development of religion and political thought 
in Malay society, 1880-1940” (Phd. Diss., University of Edinburgh, 1994), p. 66, cited in Hafiz 
Zakariya, “Islamic reform in colonial Malaya: Shaykh Tahir Jalaluddin and Sayyid Shaykh Al-
Hadi” (Phd. Diss., University of California, Santa Barbara, 2006),  p. 51.
14 M.B. Hooker. Islamic law in South-East Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 95.
15  Ibid., p. 96.
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meanwhile, were made  ex-officio Deputy Registrars of Muslim marriages.16 Where 
Islam had previously been allowed to operate under its own rules and leaders, the 
changes to the amendments governing Islam in Singapore over the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century illustrated the beginning of the state's absorption of Islam into 
the administrative apparatus.
Even with the state's incorporation of Islamic law into its legal structure, it is 
important to note that the colonial state did not seek to substantially change the nature 
of Islamic law. The changes made under the ordinance and its amendments served to 
place  the  previously  independent  religious  officials  in  the  community  under  the 
control and regulation of the British administration and also placed the community 
under the gaze of their British masters. Nevertheless, the British were not concerned 
with the substance of Islamic law, and were content to ensure only that the regulation 
of marriage and divorces took place within the colonial system. As Hooker states, 
these  developments  were  “not  concerned with  Islamic  principle  so  much  as  with 
defining  a  set  of  rules  which  applied  to  Muslims.”17 For  example,  although  the 
position  of  kathis was  made  into  government  appointments  through  the  1923 
Amendment,  the  power  to  conduct  marriages  and  divorces  and  determine  their 
validity continued to remain untouched by the government.18 Thus, while Islamic law 
became a part  of the legal system, it  still  retained its autonomy rooted within the 
Muslim community. 
This  contradiction  between  autonomy  and  incorporation  into  the  colonial 
structure  had its  benefits  and drawbacks for  reformist  groups.  One one hand,  the 
16 Ibid., p. 100.
17 M.B. Hooker, “Muhammadan Law and Islamic Law” in Islam in South-East Asia, ed. M.B. Hooker 
(Leiden: Brill, 1983), p. 175.
18 Hooker, Islamic law in South-East Asia,  p. 100.
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relative liberalism towards religion in Singapore gave reformers a haven from which 
they could operate and spread their reform agenda throughout the rest of the region. It 
was  not  a  coincidence  that  many  reformist  groups  and  individuals  established 
themselves in Singapore and set up printing presses to disseminate their reformist 
tracts. On the other hand, the British colonial government's desire to remain aloof 
from religious matters meant that reformers could not expect any real support from 
the government for their cause. 
Getting the authorities to agree to any reforms that could allow Muslims a 
greater presence in the public sphere and also more power was a formidable task. The 
authorities' inertia and reluctance to side with any particular faction was apparent in 
the MAB, which the Colonial Secretary R.J. Wilkinson envisioned as a means for the 
community to transmit their concerns to their British rulers,19 in the hope of avoiding 
uprisings similar to the 1915 Sepoy mutiny.  Despite  this  well-meaning intent,  the 
board had little power beyond an advisory capacity to the authorities for it had no 
means  of  effecting  any substantive  change  to  the  laws  and  regulations  affecting 
Muslims. The board was merely a means for the British to keep tabs on developments 
within the Muslim community,  so that they would not be caught unawares of any 
simmering matters of discontent that could spiral out of control. This impotence made 
the MAB a lightning rod for criticisms in the eyes of many in the community with 
some questioning its  right  to represent the Muslim community,  while others  were 
dissatisfied with its lack of powers.20 Suggestions for alternatives or improvements to 
the MAB were however left un-entertained by the British who having achieved their 
aim, had no interest in getting dragged into an internal dispute within the community.
19 Abdul, “Malacca Muslims not to have board: Failure of five years of pressure”, ST, 19 December 
1934, p. 17.
20 Moshe Yegar, Islam and Islamic institutions in British Malaya, pp. 105, 108.
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With the policy of non-interference in place, the British were satisfied to leave 
the Muslim community to deal with its own problems. Though reformists such as 
Syed Syeikh Al-Hadi were already aware of the need for changes to deal with the 
social problems in the community, there was little hope for help from the authorities. 
Without recourse to the authorities' political and administrative machinery, there was 
hardly any substantial  reforms that could be pushed through for the betterment of 
Muslims. The authorities were satisfied with taking control of the administration and 
regulation of Islam, and were uninterested in any disputes or debates concerning the 
reformation of Islamic practices and beliefs that may have raged in the community.
Islam's place in the decolonisation movement
The  post-World  War  Two  period  saw  significant  political  changes  in 
Singapore, as the British slowly handed power over to the city's inhabitants. More 
local representatives began to be elected to the island's legislative bodies and political 
institutions, as the British affirmed their commitment to allow Singapore a greater 
degree  of  political  autonomy.  With  local  resident  politicians  beginning to  acquire 
greater  prominence and political  power,  it  was  only natural  that  they turned their 
attention towards using their new positions as a tool to effect changes in the island 
and upon its various ethnic and religious communities. At this point in time however, 
while attempting to shed the policy of non-interference, local legislators were as yet 
unable to fully utilise the state to effect social change. 
The first step towards greater local representation in the post-war era came in 
1948  through  the  creation  of  a  Legislative  Council.  Previously,  legislative 
representatives had been appointed by the Governor, but the 1948 Legislative Council 
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allowed for the popular election of six legislative members out of a total of twenty-
two available seats. Though the voting process was open only to British subjects, and 
the six elected members were dwarfed by the sixteen other appointed or nominated 
members,21 the expansion in representation would provided more opportunities for 
local issues to be brought forth. 
The main beneficiaries of Britain's political liberalisation was the Singapore 
Progressive  Party  (SPP).  Professing  a  non-racial,  non-communal  and  classless 
political  ideology,22 the  SPP won  three  out  of  the  six  seats  up  for  elections.  Its 
successful candidates  − John Laycock, Nazir  Mallal  and Tan Chye Ching  − were 
drawn from the ranks of successful educated middle-class that,  while loyal to the 
British  flag,  nevertheless  identified  themselves  with  the  island  of  Singapore.  As 
Laycock declared in  the Legislative Council,  Singapore  was “no longer  a  city of 
immigrants” and that its inhabitants were “entitled to all the considerations that the 
Government  could  properly  give  them in  future.”23 With  this  statement,  Laycock 
served notice that the social welfare of the various peoples in the island would be on 
Laycock and his fellow new legislators' minds.  
The SPP's expressed desire to work for the benefits of Singapore's inhabitants 
and its non-communal platform meant that religion and ethnicity were not issues that 
the  party considered  to  be  off-limits.  Laycock  himself  had  demonstrated  that  the 
party's ideology were not merely empty words. In the post-war period in which food 
was  scarce  and  rationing  was  necessary,  Laycock  eschewed  his  right  to  claim  a 
European ration card that  would have entitled him to better  rations,  preferring to 
21 E. Kay Gillis, Singapore civil society and British power (Singapore: Talisman, 2005), pp. 130-131.
22 Progressive Party Newsletter, number 2, 15.3.52. cited in Gillis, Singapore civil society and British  
power, p. 132.
23 “S'pore 'no longer city of aliens'”, ST, 20 Oct 1949, p. 7. 
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obtain a ration card meant for Asians instead. Laycock's mentality that “what is good 
enough for my Chinese, Indian or Malay brothers is good enough for me” and his 
condemnation of the discrimination demonstrated his resolve to work for the benefit 
of Singapore's inhabitants regardless of their communal origins.24 Women too, were 
not left out of Laycock's political work, as he sought to bring parity to women' social 
status and expand their public rights. Laycock's introduction of a bill in March 1950 
allowing women to become jurors exemplified his desire to allow women parity,25 
while his bill scrapping a property requirement for voters in the municipal elections 
enfranchised many women who had previously been deprived of the right to vote.26
In  this  light,  Laycock's  decision  to  introduce  a  bill  in  1950  that  would 
eradicate child marriages across the entire island regardless of religion and ethnicity 
becomes  clearer.  It  was  another  expression  of  an  ethos  that  sought  to  intervene 
decisively in the political and social development of Singapore's ethnic and religious 
communities. The Nadrah/Maria Hertogh controversy had already shown that child 
marriages could spark problems within Singapore, and thus, as with issues such as 
discrimination and women's right to vote, necessitated immediate attention. Laycock's 
non-communal and socially orientated approach was as evident here as it had been in 
his other legislative projects. He defended the Marriage Bill as “a social reform … 
treated on that basis only, instead of involving religious discussion or argument at 
all.”27 In the name of “social reform”, Laycock was willing to use the state to bring 
change into society. 
24 “Butter system 'odious', ST, 19 May 1948, p. 7. 
25 “Jury work for women”, ST, 13 March 1950, p. 5. 
26 “Housewives back Mr. Laycock, 'End property bar'”, ST, 14 April 1949, p. 7. 
27 Proceedings of the Second Legislative Council, Colony of Singapore, 17 July 1951, (Singapore: 
Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. B164-165, cited in Khairudin Aljunied, Colonialism, 
violence and Muslims in Southeast Asia, p. 121.
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Unfortunately,  the  state's  intervention  in  the  Muslim  community's  affairs 
ultimately ended in failure as Laycock was forced to exclude Muslims from the Bill's  
jurisdiction. Though the bill was not without its supporters, as seen from the warm 
reception  that  it  received  from Muslim feminists,  it  was  unable  to  overcome the 
protests  that  came  from individuals  aligned  with  the  modernist  and  conservative 
camps. The Muslim feminists' support for state intervention was conditioned by the 
feminists' position in the fringes of the community's power centres, leaving the state 
as the only viable option for bringing social change. 
Opposition to Laycock's Bill stemmed from the perception that the state was 
reneging on its policy of non-interference, since it was introducing a legislation that 
would limit the practise of Islam on the island.28 Al-Edros saw the legislation as an 
attempt to handicap the exercise of Islamic laws and thereby facilitate the subjugation 
of Muslims  under the state's  laws.29 Faced with the scale of protests that the Bill 
engendered, which included legislators such as Sardon Jubir; J.M. Namazie and even 
Laycock's fellow SPP legislator Nazir Mallal, Laycock was forced to scale back the 
state's  intrusion  into  Muslim  affairs.  Thus,  modernists  firmly  rejected  the  state's 
attempts to impose restrictions that were seen as explicitly contradicting Islamic laws. 
This did not mean however, that modernists were entirely against the state's 
attempt to expand its presence in the Muslim community. In contrast to the furore 
agains the Laycock Bill, the state's creation of the Syariah Court  did not elicit similar  
vehement  responses  expressing  fears  of  undue  governmental  influence  in  the 
community and Islam. Admittedly, Al-Edros expressed his dissatisfaction concerning 
the Governor's role in the appointment of the Court's members and his powers to 
28 “Bill on marriage 'against Islam'”, ST, 31 August 1950, p. 8. “Bid to ban child marriages gazetted”. 
ST, 2 September 1950, p. 7. 
29 “Laycock membangkitkan perasaan Islam”, Qalam, vol. 3, October 1950, p. 17.
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overturn  the  Court's  rulings.  Despite  these  pockets  of  disquietude,  the  Court  was 
roundly  welcomed  by  almost  all  segments  of  the  Muslim  community.  That  an 
institution created by the state and one which would regulate the religion was greeted 
with  a  positive  response  rather  than  engendering  immediate  suspicion  seemed  to 
suggest  the  community's  receptiveness  towards  state  control.  On  the  surface,  the 
Court's creation seemed to herald the advent of state control of religion. 
One reason why the community was far more accommodating towards the 
Court's  creation  stemmed  from  the  fact  that  the  idea  had  gained  popularity  and 
support within the community for some time. Modernists and feminists had, at one 
time or another, expressed their hopes that such a Court could be established as a way 
to check the various abuses of marriage and divorce rites in the community. A Syariah 
Court, they argued, would be an effective means of resolving the burgeoning family 
and moral crisis.  In this  regard,  modernists  such as Ahmad Ibrahim and Al-Edros 
were united with unlikely allies like Shirin Fozdar and Che Zahara in calling for a 
Syariah  Court.  In  this  respect,  the  Court  was  an  idea  that  would  be  mutually 
beneficial  to  all  parties.  The  state  benefited  from  the  extension  of  the  state's 
administrative structure deeper into the community, while reformers envisioned the 
Court's use as a means of forwarding social reforms.
Moreover,  despite  the  supervisory powers  that  the  Governor  and the  state 
would have over the Court's functioning, it did not propose to restrict the practice or 
execution of Islam in Singapore.  While the Court would further extend the state's 
oversight over the regulation of Islam, it also reflected the policy of non-interference 
in  religion  as  it  continued  to  let  decisions  on  Islamic  jurisprudence  and  Islamic 
practices  remain  with  the  community.  In  fact,  the  proposal  to  turn  kathis from 
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freelancers  relying  on  marriage  and  divorce  fees  for  their  incomes  into  paid 
employees of the state was seen as a positive development that would reduce the 
potential for corruption and misbehaviour.30 Thus, the decision to expand the state's 
control  over  the  administration  of  Islam  was  viewed  positively,  because  of  the 
opportunities that could be obtained from the greater access to the state's resources.
It  is  apparent  therefore,  that  the  Muslim community was  amenable  to  the 
state's expanding regulatory control over Islam. They had no qualms over the state's 
attempt  to  place  formerly  independent  Muslim  religious  leaders  into  the 
administrative and bureaucratic system. Making the Syariah Court a state institution 
and its workers paid employees of the state did not raise too much alarm concerning 
the state's intent. Muslims drew the line however, at attempts by politicians to use the 
state as a way to push through social reforms that would have drastically changed the 
customs and practices in the community. Laycock's Bill was immediately seen as a 
transgression against the policy of non-interference which had been  the cornerstone 
of  the  state  and  religion  interaction.  These  protests,  coupled  with  the  limited 
autonomy that local politicians had during this period, meant that the state could not 
be used to implement the necessary changes.  
The PAP and Islam
The  PAP's  ascendancy  to  political  power  and  the  continuing  handover  of 
power  to  locals  had  a  significant  impact  on both  Islam and the  state.  The PAP's 
success  in  the  first  nationwide  general  elections  in  1959 afforded them a greater 
legitimacy compared to the SPP and John Laycock. Moreover, the shift to self-rule 
30 “Muslim law court for colony”, ST, 14 January 1952, p. 7; “Isteri orang dicerai dan dinikahkan”, 
Qalam, April 1952, vol. 21, p. 6.
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(except for foreign affairs and defence) meant that control of the state fell entirely 
onto the shoulders of the PAP. Even more so than their British and SPP predecessors, 
the PAP evinced a greater willingness to further extend the state's boundaries 
The PAP's willingness to engineer social  reform was evident in the party's 
promise  to  introduce  legislation  that  would  alleviate  the  plight  of  women  in 
Singapore. As seen in Chapter Three, feminists' efforts to reach out to political parties 
paid off, as it resulted in the formulation and the passing of the Women's Charter. It 
would be naive to attribute the Women's Charter solely to the feminists' efforts, for 
the PAP also had much to gain from its  progressive social  agenda.  The PAP had 
recognised that women could play an important role in the political arena. The PAP's 
recognition  of  women's  potential  role followed  on  the  back  of the  Communists' 
attempts to advance gender equality. As PAP politician Ong Pang Boon noted, “the 
Communists  had  recognized  the  potential  of  exploiting  this  injustice  [towards 
women], and were first in the field to organise women into their fold.”31 In an election 
that gave the right to vote to both men and women, women's votes were an important 
demographic  that  could  not  be  ignored.  Consequently,  the  PAP's  1959  election 
manifesto boldly declared that: 
We shall foster the principle, if necessary by legislation, that 
there shall  be equality of women with men in all  spheres and we 
shall  encourage them to come forward and play a leading role  in 
politics, administration, business and industry, education and in other 
spheres.32
Even as the PAP attempted to rally women to their flag, they were careful not to 
alienate Muslims. In the same manifesto, the declaration that “ in order to emancipate 
31 Ong Pang Boon, “Problems of Party organization: The Pro-Communist Challenge from within, 
1954-'57”, in People's Action Party, 1954-1979: Petir 25th anniversary issue (Singapore: Central 
Executive Committee, PAP, 1979), p. 52.
32 The Tasks Ahead: P.A.P.'s Five-Year Plan, 1959-1964 (Singapore: PAP, 1959), p. 11.
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them[women]  from  the  bonds  of  feudalism  and  conservatism  a  monogamous 
marriage law will be passed”, was followed immediately with a qualifier that “such a 
law  however  will  not  apply  in  those  cases  where  there  is  a  conflict  with  their 
religious  beliefs.”33 The  statement  clearly referred  to  the  Muslim community,  for 
whom polygamy was a religiously sanctioned practice. It was designed to reassure the 
community that any future reforms would take heed of their religious beliefs, and 
exclude them from its execution. While supportive of greater women's rights and the 
need for reform, the PAP was aware that any interference in the religion would lead to 
a political backlash. Their acceptance of Fozdar's feminist cause had its limits, and 
regardless of how much she petitioned for the inclusion of Muslim women, it would 
not cause the PAP to budge from their stand.  
The  PAP's  reluctance  to  intervene  did  not  mean  however,  that  they  were 
averse  to  advancing  further  the  process  of  state  regulation  over  Islam.  The 
culmination of state control over Islam came with AMLA's passing in 1966 repealing 
its predecessor, the 1957 Muslim Ordinance. Retaining most of the features present in 
the Ordinance, AMLA also introduced new bodies and positions further enhancing the 
state's  control  over  the  administration  of  Islam.  The  much  criticised  MAB  was 
dissolved and its  role  taken up by a  new organisation  – the Majlis  Ugama Islam 
Singapura (MUIS) that would take up the mantle of regulating Islam in Singapore. 
The Muslim community's  long-standing desire for a  Mufti was finally fulfilled,  as 
AMLA empowered the President of Singapore to appoint a Mufti.34 
 To  characterize  the  PAP's  move  as  an  “example  of  the  intrusion  of  the 
authoritarian state” into religion, as Lily Zubaidah Rahim,35 has done would be to 
33 Ibid.
34 Hooker, Islamic law in South-East Asia, p. 110.
35 Lily Zubaidah Rahim, “Governing Islam and regulating Muslims in Singapore's secular 
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focus unduly on structures of control and thereby ignoring the entire trajectory of the 
state's expansion and also the PAP's engagement with the community to ensure that 
the Bill did not cause undue dissatisfaction. Her contention that AMLA was a means 
of controlling Islam in Singapore through MUIS' creation as a “religious bureaucracy 
… that  has  centralised  Islamic  affairs”,36  fails  to  take  into  account  the  Muslim 
community's  opportunity to contribute its  views in the process of formulating the 
AMLA Bill. In the six years from the time when AMLA was first proposed in 1960 to 
its  eventual  codification,  the  bill  was  continually refined  and  subjected  to  public 
opinion.  This  provided the opportunity for individuals  and groups to  submit  their 
suggestions and improvements, giving modernists and feminists the avenue to again 
turn  to  the  state  and  law  as  the  tools  for  social  reform.  Public  meetings  were 
organised by Singapore UMNO, Muhammadiyah and Jamiyah to discuss the virtues 
and  shortcomings  of  the  proposed  bill,  which  were  later  submitted  to  the  Select 
Committee in charge of amending the bill.37 These groups' input and  requests for 
more time to study the proposed bill contents further prompted the Select Committee 
to suggest that the bill be postponed.38 It was only in 1964 that AMLA was revived, 
after  the  Muslim  associations  were  satisfied  with  the  bill.  For  modernists  and 
feminists, the state was the only actor capable of enforcing and regulating the Islamic 
laws. Syariah Court President Hj. Sanusi for instance, believed that AMLA would 
bolster the Court's powers and enable it to deal more effectively with divorces and 
issues of spousal maintenance.39 To have accused the PAP of “intruding” into religion, 
authoritarian state”. Working Paper no. 156 (Perth: Murdoch University, 2009), p. 4.
36 Ibid. 
37 “UMNO terima rang undang2 islam pada dasarnya”, BH, 4, May 1961, p. 4.
38 “Muslim Law Bill ‒ There are no official recommendations”, ST, 20 May 1961, p. 6. 
39 “Percheraian S'pura berkurang BH”, ST, 22 November 1961, p. 4; “Religious council to help 
Syariah Court urged”, ST, 12 November 1964, p. 5. 
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would  therefore  misrepresent  the  government's  determination  to  involve  the 
community intimately in defining AMLA and the modernists' favourable response to 
the state's initiative. 
Rather  than  viewing  AMLA as  an  instance  of  the  state's  subjugation  of 
religion, it should be viewed as the triumph of Islamic reform through the mechanism 
of  the  state.  The  changes  that  were  contained  within  AMLA adhered  with  the 
arguments  that  forwarded  by  feminists  and  modernists.  Attorney-General  Ahmad 
Ibrahim endorsed AMLA as an unprecedented development in Singapore, and one 
that gave a Muslim body executive control over Muslim matters. Recalling the days 
when venal kathis manipulated marriages and divorces for their personal benefits, he 
pointed  out  that  the  law and AMLA ensured  that  these  practices  were  no  longer 
existent.40 In addition to eliminating corruption in the kathis' ranks, ALMA limited 
men's  flippant  use of  the  triple talaq,  it  instituted  a  minimum marriage  age;  and 
though it did not eliminate polygamy, it gave kathis greater powers to investigate an 
applicant's  background  before  proceeding  with  the  applicant's  second  marriage. 
Contrary to Hooker's claim that “the legal administration ... in Singapore is solely 
concerned with the principles  of law applicable to Muslims and not  with Islamic 
principles as such”,41 the reformers' influence in AMLA was apparent and reflected in 
AMLA's  implementation  of  the  changes  that  had  been sought  by modernists  and 
feminists.  Where  previously  the  British  colonial  state  was  concerned  only  with 
bringing the Islamic religious apparatus under the state's  control,  AMLA not only 
delineated  the  state's  jurisdiction  on  Islamic  affairs  but  it  also  established  the 
modernists' interpretation of Islam into the state's laws. 
40 “Jaksa Agong: Hindarkan seliseh faham”, BH, 17 November 1966, pp. 1, 8.
41 Hooker, Islamic law in South-East Asia, p. 118.
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Conclusion
The state's expanding reach throughout Singapore's political history provided 
reformers  with  the  means  of  extending  their  social  reforms  into  the  Muslim 
community.  Reformers who had previously encountered failures in their attempts to 
convince the community to accept their solutions now turned towards the state for 
assistance. As Singapore transitioned from a colony towards independence, the state's 
capacity and appetite to use the law to engineer social reforms increased. Unlike their 
British predecessors, local governments made social change a priority; attitudes and 
behaviours had to be changed in order to cope with the upheavals and challenges that 
political  change and independence would bring.  Thus, the state and the reformers 
mutually benefited from  their  rapprochement  – reformers were able  to  implement 
their solutions to the Muslim family crisis while the state progressively drew Islam 
under its political  and administrative control.  Modernist ideas were made possible 
only through the state's guiding hand. 
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Conclusion 
Islamic modernist reforms and the State 
With the implementation of AMLA in 1966, the debates concerning marriage 
and divorce practices in  the Muslim community which had been raging since the 
1950s finally reached its conclusion. The formulation of a minimum marriage age, the 
controls placed on polygamy and the stricter regulation of divorces was a marked 
departure from the almost anarchic situation which had existed in the early 1950s. 
The  pressing  problems  which  had  been  identified  by Shirin  Fozdar  in  1951  had 
ceased to be major issues as Singapore entered its new era as an independent country 
in the mid 1960s. 
The shift towards a greater regulation of marriage and divorce practices and 
the  changing  attitudes  towards  marriage  and  divorce  within  Singapore's  Muslim 
community can be attributed to the actions of the three different actors – modernists, 
feminists  and the  state.  Each group possessed  their  own set  of  ideas  which  they 
attempted to impose or disseminate into the Muslim community. Islamic modernists 
emphasized  the  importance  of  ijtihad and  criticised  the  existing  Islamic  practices 
which they felt had strayed from the religion's original tenets. For modernists, it was 
necessary to thus eradicate unorthodox practices which had been perpetuated by a 
religious elite that possessed little actual knowledge of Islam. Feminists meanwhile 
attacked a patriarchal society which they viewed as oppressing women and refusing 
to accord women the same rights as men. While agreeing with modernists on the need 
to reform Islam and Islamic practices, feminists possessed their own different views 
on this reformation process. Lastly, the PAP's socio-political agenda underpinned by a 
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need to create a stable and prosperous society pushed the state towards the expansion 
of women's place in the nascent nation. In order to achieve these goals, women had to 
be liberated from their domestic confines and given a greater public role than before. 
As  this  thesis  has  demonstrated  however,  this  era  of  social  reformation 
occurred  in  a  highly  contentious  environment  as  the  various  reformist  groups 
challenged one another for ideological supremacy. The greatest friction was between 
Islamic  modernists  and  Muslim feminists  within  the  Muslim community  as  both 
groups  jostled  for  ideological  supremacy.  While  there  were  indeed  instances  of 
cooperation, both groups frequently engaged in acrimonious debates in their attempts 
to discredit their opponents. Through the print media of newspapers and magazines, 
the reformists brought their social agendas into the public sphere,  presenting their 
opinions and countering their opponent's arguments in order to sway the community 
to their side.    
The controversy surrounding Maria Hertogh/Nadrah's marriage to her older 
husband and the  ensuing Laycock Bill  provided the  first  glimpse  of  the  possible 
conflicts that arose between the different groups of reformists. With the emergence of 
Muslim feminists as a force in the social arena, Islamic modernists were no longer 
assured of being the dominant voice of social reformation in the Muslim community. 
Organisations such as the MAB, Muhammadiyah and Jamiyah that had previously 
been the major organs of social reformation were challenged by the newly established 
upstarts from the MWWA and other feminists such as Shirin Fozdar. Utilising the 
same  tools  available  to  modernists,  feminists  attempted  to  challenge  modernists' 
interpretations  of  Islam  and  presented  their  alternatives  which  they  argued  were 
necessary for the expansion of women's rights in the Muslim community. 
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While their bold move to challenge modernists highlighted Muslim feminists' 
emergence as  a  force  for  social  reformation,  the  weaknesses  that  would limit  the 
effectiveness of Muslim feminists  were already evident even from the start.  Their 
confrontational  approach,  while  useful  in  projecting  their  ideas  to  the  rest  of  the 
Muslim community, won them few adherents beyond their small constituency of like-
minded sympathizers. A largely patriarchal society refused to accept the radical ideas 
advocated by feminists, and even modernists attacked feminists for supporting the 
Laycock Bill.  Women too,  were not  entirely supportive  of  feminists,  with female 
religious leaders such as Umm Muhsin firmly against the feminists' ideas of women's 
emancipation which seemed to her to reek more of Western ideas than being truly 
grounded  in  Islam's  vision  of  women's  equality.  Against  this  overwhelming 
resistance, it was not surprising that feminists were unable to make any headway in 
the debate surrounding the Laycock Bill.
The Muslim feminists movement's ineffectualness remained evident even as 
the feminist movement in Singapore made great strides. As seen in Chapter Three, 
Muslim feminists'  refusal to support the anti-polygamy measures contained in  the 
Women's Charter meant that they were unable to capitalise on the advancements won 
by their feminist brethren. Their attempts to acquire positions in the newly established 
Syariah  Court  were  also  firmly  rebuffed  by  modernists  and  conservatives  who 
rejected the possibility of allowing women to adjudicate over men in the cases that 
were to be brought to the Court's attention. Thus, the lack of any institutional means 
of asserting power within the Muslim community further diminished the opportunities 
for feminists to dictate the pace of social change. With the MWWA's closure and 
Shirin Fozdar's departure from Singapore, Muslim feminists were further weakened, 
93
leaving Islamic modernists as the dominant force for social reformation in the Muslim 
community once again.
Islamic modernists' victory over feminists did not translate into an open path 
for  the  implementation  of  their  social  reforms.  Conservatives  in  the  community 
continued to stymie modernists such as Inche Taha by resisting modernists' efforts to 
bring forth changes to the marriage and divorce practices in the Muslim community. 
Inche Taha's failures and eventual removal from his position as the Syariah Court 
President  illustrated  the  immense  difficulties  that  modernists  faced  despite  their 
newly-won  positions  in  the  Syariah  Court  system.  By  themselves,  modernists 
remained unable to subjugate their Kaum Tua rivals who continued to hold sway over 
a majority of the community. 
It  was  only through the  state's  intervention  that  allowed  modernists'  ideas 
concerning marriage and divorce to take root in the community. The PAP government 
that first came to power in 1959, brought with it a new set of ideas concerning women 
and social stability that were more akin to the modernists' views than that of their 
conservative rivals. Ahmad Ibrahim's prominent role in the judicial system, firstly as 
the State Advocate-General in 1959 and later as Attorney-General in 1963 also meant 
that modernists were given greater clout not only within the Muslim community but 
also in the national political and judicial system. Thus, by bringing themselves closer 
towards the state, modernists were finally able to realise their goal of implementing 
social reforms in the Muslim community. 
The  state  too  benefited  from  this  rapprochement.  The  ideas  proposed  by 
modernists  coincided  with  the  state's  need  for  a  stable  society  free  from  social 
problems that  could  hamper  the  drive  towards  economic  prosperity and progress. 
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Moreover, by using the judicial and political tools that were available to the state as a 
way of pushing through social reforms, the state further continued its expansion over 
the religious affairs of the Muslim community. An independent state could not allow 
for  the  existence  of  a   realm of  rules  and regulations  that  was not  subject  to  its 
jurisdiction. Thus, a process of state expansion that had first begun under the British 
reached its conclusion under the PAP as AMLA finally brought the regulation of a 
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